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POVZETEK 
DAVČNE UTAJE DDV NA ENERGETSKIH TRGIH V EVROPSKI UNIJI 
Tema magistrske naloge se nanaša na raziskavo davčnih utaj na energetskem trgu v 
Evropski Uniji (v nadaljevanju EU). V preteklosti so bile davčne utaje povezane predvsem z 
dobrinami kot so avtomobili, mobilni telefoni, računalniško opremo, luksuznimi predmeti 
itd. Danes se je ta pojav razširil na področja kot so trg elektrike in plina ter emisijskih 
kuponov oz. dovolilnic, saj je davčne utaje na teh trgih težje izslediti in dokazati, gre pa tudi 
za veliko večje zneske kot pri ostalih omenjenih dobrinah. Z odstranitvijo notranjih meja 
med državami članicami EU se je čezmejno trgovanje z elektriko, plinom ter emisijskimi 
dovolilnicami zelo razširilo in hkrati postalo tarča mnogih goljufij glede utaje davka. 
Posledice tega so bile najbolj vidne leta 2009, saj je na podlagi trgovanja na trgu emisijskih 
dovolilnic izginilo med 1,7 do 1,9 bilijonov evrov na francoski platformi za trgovanje 
Bluenext ter povzročilo skorajšnji zlom trga z emisijskimi dovolilnicami. Poleg tega so 
relevantni še drugi odmevni primeri davčnih utaj na energetskih trgih, kot so primeri 
Dosanjh, Citibank in Deutsche Bank. Vsi ti primeri dokazujejo izgubo velikih zneskov, še 
posebej pri trgovanju z emisijskimi dovolilnicami. Gre za pojav manjkajočega trgovca oz. za 
tako imenovani davčni vrtiljak. Ta pojav se je preselil na energetski trg in z vedno večjimi 
finančnimi izgubami se je EU začela zavedati določenih problemov davčne reforme iz leta 
2006. K temu so prav tako pripomogle energetske borze, ki so prav z izvajanjem nadzora 
nad energetskimi trgi lahko sledile množičnemu pojavu davčnih utaj.  
Z uvedbo Direktive 2006/112/EC (v nadaljevanju DDV direktiva) je EU želela vzpostaviti 
enoten davčni sistem ter preprečiti davčne utaje. Mehanizem obrnjene davčne obveznosti 
je eno izmed najpomembnejših orodij za preprečevanje davčnih utaj v EU, sprejet po 
intenzivnem lobiranju. Sprememba DDV direktive je dovolila državam članicam da 
implementirajo mehanizem obrnjene davčne obveznosti, ko izpolnjujejo določene pogoje, 
vendar so ga do danes implementirale le nekatere. Večinoma gre za tiste države, ki so bile 
tarča velikih finančnih izgub zaradi davčnih utaj. Ker je implementacija mehanizma 
obrnjene davčne obveznosti sprejeta samo v določenih državam članicah, se je pojavil 
problem neenakosti in nekoordiniranosti, ki je še posebej viden pri čezmejnem trgovanju 
na energetskem trgu. To predstavlja problem, ko gre za trgovanje med državo članico, ki 
ima vzpostavljen mehanizem obrnjene davčne obveznosti, in tisto, ki tega ni vzpostavila. 
EU kot tudi energetske borze pozivajo k vpeljavi mehanizma obrnjene davčne obveznosti 
na vseh področjih, ne samo na področjih relevantnih za državo članico. Prav tako pa 
opozarjajo, da je prav zaradi čezmejnega trgovanja potreben enoten davčni sistem med 
državami.  
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Osrednji problem magistrske naloge je izpostavljena grožnja glede izgube nadzora tako 
evropskih institucij, kot posameznih nacionalnih oblasti nad trenutnim davčnim sistemom, 
povezanih z energetskim trgom. Omenjena grožnja se pojavi zaradi pomanjkanja 
koordinacije in sodelovanja med državami članicami. Po vpeljavi mehanizma obrnjene 
davčne obveznosti v nekaterih državah članicah so se davčne utaje zmanjšale, v primerjavi 
z državami članicami, ki tega mehanizma še niso vpeljale. Še vedno pa lahko vidimo 
problem držav, kot je npr. Francija, ki je mehanizem obrnjene davčne obveznosti že vpeljala 
vendar pa se še vedno sooča z velikim številom davčnih utaj zaradi čezmejnega trgovanja z 
državami, ki tega še niso vpeljale. Na tem primeru lahko vidimo, da je potreben koordiniran 
pristop s strani EU, kar poudarjajo tudi največje energetske borze, ki nadzorujejo trg 
elektrike, plina in emisijskih dovolilnic ter potrdil o izvoru. Osrednja problematika naloge 
se tako nanaša na raziskavo dodatnih možnosti za boj proti davčnim utajam.  
Namen študije je potrditi ali zavrniti naslednji hipotezi: 
Hipoteza 1: S sodelovanjem, izmenjavo znanja med evropskimi institucijami ter z uporabo 
že razpoložljivih, vendar razpršenih informacij bi lahko zmanjšali pomanjkanje DDV. 
Hipoteza 2: Centraliziran nadzor na evropski ravni je najučinkovitejše orodje za 
preprečevanje goljufij in zmanjšanje davčnih utaj na energetskem trgu. 
Z nalogo želim doseči večjo razširjenost znanja o energetskem trgu v povezavi z davčnimi 
utajami ter podrobneje analizirati sodobne rešitve, ki bi prispevale k zmanjšanju davčne 
vrzeli. Davčne utaje so znan pojav na mnogih področjih, vendar so raziskave, ki so povezane 
z energetskih področjem, kot npr. trg elektrike, plina, emisijskih kuponov, še vedno manj 
znane širši javnosti. Prav zaradi tega je namen naloge je opozoriti na problematiko 
ugotavljanja davčnih utaj s perspektive trga elektrike, plina in emisijskih dovolilnic ter 
nujnost poenostavitve in koordinacije evropskega davčnega sistema, ki bi zagotovila večjo 
preglednost ter zmanjšala pojav davčnih utaj na energetskem trgu. Cilj je raziskati prednosti 
in slabosti delovanja davčnega sistema EU na energetskem trgu ter z analizo različnih 
primerov prikazati stanje v državah članicah EU. Prav tako je cilj analizirati obstoječe in nove 
predloge rešitev za zmanjšanje davčne vrzeli.  
V magistrski nalogi sta uporabljena deskriptivna metoda raziskovanja ter analitični pristop. 
V okviru deskriptivne metode so opisani pojmi in dejstva po metodi klasifikacije. Podatki so 
pridobljeni iz tujih primarnih in sekundarnih virov. Primarni viri vključujejo direktive in 
regulative evropskih institucij, priporočila s strani evropskih agencij, itd. Sekundarni viri 
vključujejo strokovne članke, poročila ter raziskave relevantnih institucij.  V empiričnem 
delu so podatki pridobljeni z izvedbo dveh intervjujev ter ankete.  
Začetki DDV in energetski trgovinski sistemi so prestavljeni v štirih delih: 1) Zgodovina DDV; 
2) Ocena davčne vrzeli za DDV; 3) Trenutni davčni sistem ter; 4) Značilnosti trgovanja z 
energetskih dobrinami ter njihove pomanjkljivosti. 
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Zgodovina DDV se začenja pri dejstvu da je DDV eden izmed sodobnejših davkov, ki se je 
razvil po prvi svetovni vojni, vendar je bil takrat sprejet le v redkih državah v Evropi. Kasneje 
se je zaradi globalizacije sistem DDV razširil v več kot 130 držav po vsem svetu. V 20. stoletju 
lahko vidimo porast sistema DDV v večini držav EU. V okviru DDV v EU je pomembno 
omeniti naslednje mejnike. Prva faza sprememb se je začela leta 1967 in 1977, ko so se 
države EU dogovorile o skupnem svežnju davčnih pravil za storitve in blago, ki so bili tudi 
podlaga za vzpostavitev sistema DDV v EU. To so bili prvi koraki v smeri vzpostavitve 
evropske davčne integracije. Naslednji mejnik je bil leta 1993 z ustanovitvijo enotnega 
gospodarskega trga, ko je bil ukinjen davčni nadzor med mejami EU. Glavna sprememba 
naj bi bila zamenjava namembnega sistema DDV (angl. destination-based system) z 
sistemom DDV, ki temelji na poreklu (angl. origin-based system). Zaradi nestrinjanja med 
državami članicami se je obdržal prehodni sistem DDV, ki naj bi prvotno trajal za omejeno 
obdobje štirih let, vendar se je podaljševal vse do danes. Evropska Komisija (v nadaljevanju 
EK) je leta 2000 predstavila predlog s štirimi glavnimi cilji: poenostavitev sedanjih pravil EU 
o DDV, posodobitev pravil DDV, enotnejša uporaba veljavnih pravil in močnejše upravno 
sodelovanje. Omenjena pravila in spremembe sistema DDV se nanašajo na zapleten sistem, 
ki je povzročil širjenje davčnih utaj. Leta 2010 je evropska skupnost izpostavila, da sedanji 
sistem s svojo zapletenostjo in številnimi pomanjkljivostmi povzroča dovzetnost za goljufije, 
in še posebej opozorila na utaje s sistemom davčnega vrtiljaka (De la Feria, 2010, str. 25–
28). 
Naslednji pomemben mejnik je bila DDV Direktiva. Pomembno je omeniti, da je bila uvedba 
pravil za skupni sistem DDV iz leta 2006 zelo nedavna in da je morala EU obravnavati 
številne ovire v zvezi z usklajevanjem med državami članicami za vzpostavitev skupnega 
sistema DDV. Dejstvo je, da so se čezmejne goljufije na področju DDV v večji meri pojavile 
z odpravo meja leta 1993, zaradi česar se je morala EU v večji meri osredotočiti na 
preprečevanje goljufij. Poleg tega se EU ni mogla dogovoriti o spremembi sistema DDV, do 
nedavnega, ko je EK 7. aprila 2016 sprejela Akcijski načrt o DDV. Na splošno je akcijski načrt 
usmerjen v t. i. "enoten evropski DDV sistem" ali "dokončni sistem DDV". Predlog se nanaša 
na čezmejne transakcije, kjer je blago še vedno obdavčeno po DDV stopnji v namembni 
državi članici, način pobiranja davkov pa bi se spremenil (European Commission, 2016a, str. 
3). 
V drugem delu definicija davčne vrzeli, po predlogu EK pomeni "razlika med ocenjenimi 
prihodki iz DDV, ki jih pričakujejo države članice (skupna davčna obveznost DDV ali VTTL), 
in dejanskim zneskom DDV". Septembra 2017 je EK v sporočilu za javnost, izpostavila izgube 
v višini 152 bilijonov evrov zaradi vrzeli DDV iz leta 2015. V sporočilu za medije EK poziva k 
nujni reformi sistema DDV, odvisni od nacionalnih vlad, ki bi morale reformirati in 
zagotavljati bolj nadzorovane čezmejne transakcije (European Commission, 2017). Ozadje 
publikacije se nanaša na študijo o vrzeli pri pobiranju DDV v državah članicah EU, ki meri in 
primerja vrzel pri pobiranju DDV od 2012 do 2016. Študija predvideva ločeno analizo vsake 
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države članice po različnih sektorjih. V letu 2016 se je davčna vrzel DDV v primerjavi s 
preteklimi leti nekoliko zmanjšala vendar je leta 2016 še vedno znašala 145.4  bilijonov 
evrov (Institute for Advanced Studies, 2018, str. 16–17).  
Tretji del opisuje prehodni sistem DDV iz leta 1993, ki je bil sprejet zaradi pomanjkanja 
dogovora med državami članicami, in v praksi pomeni dve različni transakciji pri čezmejnem 
trgovanju blaga znotraj EU. Prva transakcija se nanaša na dobavo znotraj EU, ki je med 
državami članicami oproščena DDV, ali z drugimi besedami, dobavitelj blaga ne obračuna 
DDV pri transakcijah iz ene v drugo državo članico. Druga transakcija se nanaša na 
pridobitev davka znotraj posamezne države članice, ki je obdavčena (Puccio, 2019, str. 3). 
Glavni  problemi t.i. tranzicijskega sistema, ugotovljeni po študiji ocene učinka EU (2017, 
str. 20), so ogromne izgube zaradi čezmejnih goljufij na področju DDV ter kompleksni sistem 
DDV, ki se do danes še ni spremenil. 
Četrti del opisuje sistem trgovanja z emisijskimi dovolilnicami ali trgovanje s pokrovom 
(angl. »cap-and-trade«) ki ima svojo osnovo v Kjotskem protokolu, kjer „zgornja meja“ 
pomeni mejo skupne toplogredne emisije, ki jo podjetje lahko proizvede v določeni državi 
članici. Delovanje trgovanja z emisijskimi dovolilnicami se tako izvaja z „enotami“, kjer je 
ena enota enaka eni toni izpusta ogljikovega dioksida (v nadaljevanju CO2) (Interpol, 2013, 
str. 2). Po poročilu Svetovne banke je bil emisijski trg najhitreje rastoči trg z blagom v letu 
2011, ocenjen na 176 milijard evrov. Največji sistem trgovanja z emisijami je trenutno 
Evropski sistem trgovanja z emisijami. Evropski sistem trgovanja z emisijskimi dovolilnicami 
ima tri glavne faze izvedbe. Prva faza trgovanja se navezuje na nacionalni razdelitveni načrt 
(angl. national allocation plan - NAP) ter je trajala od 2005 do 2007. Z drugimi besedami 
poimenovana tudi poskusna faza se nanaša na prilagoditve novo vzpostavljenega sistema, 
vzpostavitev določenih pravil ter podatkovne baze oz. registra za emisijske kupone (angl. 
The Community Independent Transaction Log -  CITL). Druga ali zavezujoča faza je potekala 
od 2008 do 2012. Nanaša se na Kjotski protokol (mednarodni sporazum, ki skuša zmanjšati 
emisije toplogrednih plinov, in je začel je veljati 15. Februarja 2005) ki določa zmanjšanje 
emisij za 8 % glede na raven iz leta 1990, določa pa tudi bolj striktna pravila glede kršenja 
zavezanosti. Tretja faza, ki traja od leta 2013 do 2020, prepoznava potrebo po večji 
usklajenosti sistema in uresničevanju ciljev (Interpol, 2013, str. 7). 
V skladu z 19. členom DDV direktive se elektrika in plin obravnavata kot blago za namene 
DDV. Razlika v primerjavi z drugimi dobrinami je v tem, da se električna energija in plin ne 
shranjujeta. Prav zaradi tega za ti dve vrsti blaga veljajo posebna pravila trgovanja. 
Trgovanje oz. oskrba z energijo poteka po shemi kodiranja na energetskem trgu EU. Ta 
shema uporablja unikatne identifikacijske kode imenovane tudi Energy Identification Code 
(v nadaljevanju EIC), ki jih udeleženci na trgu prejmejo šele po registraciji pri svojem 
nacionalnem organu. Trgovanje poteka dvostransko, z bilateralno izmenjavo ali preko 
posrednikov. V ta namen je potrebna koda EIC, ki omogoča postopek spletnega imenovanja 
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ter identifikacijo tržnih udeležencev. Po trgovanju se dobava energije prenese po omrežju 
operaterja prenosnega sistema. Pomen notranjega trga z energijo na ravni EU je z leti 
naraščal, zato so bile vzpostavljene posebne določbe in institucije za nadzor napredka v 
smeri enotne energetske unije. V ta namen je bila ustanovljena Agencija za sodelovanje na 
področju energetskih regulatorjev (v nadaljevanju ACER), ki je uvedla nadzor v skladu z 
Uredbo o celovitosti in preglednosti veleprodajnega energetskega trga (v nadaljevanju 
REMIT), ki je od vseh držav članic in njihovih udeležencev na trgu zahtevala, da poročajo in 
upoštevajo pravila določena z regulativo (So Young, 2017, str. 4). 
Karakteristike trga elektrike so zelo podobne trgovanju z emisijskimi dovolilnicami, kar 
pomeni enake možnosti za davčne utaje. Razlogi, ki so prispevali k goljufiji z DDV na trgih 
električne energije in plina, kot tudi na trgu potrdil o izvoru so naslednji (Europex, 2017, str. 
7): 
- Povezava s trgom emisij pomeni podobne trgovinske vzorce; 
- Implementacija mehanizma obrnjene davčne obveznosti v večini držav EU na trgu 
emisijskih dovolilnic, ne pa tudi na trgu elektrike, plina ter potrdil o izvoru; 
- Liberalizacija energetskih trgov, kar je povečalo obseg trgovanja po vsej EU; 
- Minimalne tehnične zahteve za trgovanje z električno energijo in plinom; 
- Zelo nizki ali celo ničelni prevozni stroški; 
- Omejen nadzor trgovanja; 
- Določen kraj dobave, čezmejna dobava blaga velikokrat ni potrebna; 
- Rekapitulacijska poročila za dobavo plina in električne energije niso potrebna; 
- Nacionalni energetski organi ne morejo preprečiti ali zavrniti pridobitve dovoljenja za 
trgovanje z energetskimi dobrinami določenemu sumljivemu podjetju; in 
- Davčna tajnost med davčnimi organi, ki preprečuje izmenjavo ustreznih informacij z 
energetskimi regulatorji. 
Glavni pojmi ter pogoji, ki so ključnega pomena za razumevanje organiziranih goljufij DDV 
so utemeljeni z opisom razvoja MTIC ter pojem davčnega vrtiljaka, nadaljnje je nakazana 
primerjava med različnimi vrstami davčnih verig MTIC. Najpogostejša goljufija, ki izkorišča 
trenutni (tranzicijski) davčni sistem se imenuje goljufija neplačujočega gospodarskega 
subjekta, izraz ki ga ponavadi uporabljamo tudi v slovenskem jeziku je »missing trader Intra-
Community« (v nadaljevanju MTIC utaja). V svoji najbolj preprosti obliki MTIC utaja poteka 
tako da gre za kombinacijo transakcij znotraj države članice (DDV je v tem primeru 
obračunan) ter transakcijo med državami članicami EU (DDV ni obračunan). Eden izmed 
udeležencev t.i. izginjajoči trgovec (angl. missing trader) (v nadaljevanju MT) preprosto 
izgine, in s tem tudi DDV, ki bi ga moral izplačati v davčno blagajno. Izginjajočega trgovca je 
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mogoče prepoznati po tem da nima poslovnih prostorov, z zaposlenimi pa je težko 
vzpostaviti kakršenkoli stik, saj gre večinoma za fiktivne osebe. Dejavniki, ki omogočajo rast 
goljufij na področju DDV v EU (House of Lords, 2007, str. 10) so blago z visoko vrednostjo 
in majhno težo, ki ga je lažje prevažati. V povezavi z energetskimi dobrinami gre za 
elektronske transakcije ki omogočajo še lažjo izvedbo DDV utaj; obdavčitev z ničelno 
stopnjo med nekaterimi državami članicami znotraj EU; odprava notranjih meja pomeni 
težavo s preverjanjem. Vrste davčnih utaj so naslednje: 
- Nakupna goljufija: Pri nakupni goljufiji (angl. acquisition fraud) se blago iz določene 
države članice EU prenese v drugo državo članico, kjer se nahaja izginjajoči trgovec, 
kar namensko naredi določena družba v prvi državi članici. MT je vedno tisti ki izgine 
brez sledu in pri tem ne plača DDV v državni proračun (Anderson & Franzen, 2008, 
str. 23).  
- Davčni vrtiljak (angl. carousel fraud) že z samim imenom pojasni svoje lastnosti. 
Transakcije še vedno potekajo kot opisano pri nakupni goljufiji zgoraj, razlika je le 
ta, da se ponavljajo ter tako ustvarjajo t.i. vrtiljak ali vrtenje blaga v krogu. Dodati je 
potrebno še da takšna shema vsebuje vrsto transakcij z večjimi državami članicami 
kot tudi s tretjimi državami. V primerjavi s prejšnjo oblike davčne utaje gre tukaj za 
bolj kompleksno vrsto saj je potrebno čezmejno sodelovanje večjih subjektov. 
Velikokrat nekatera izmed vpletenih podjetji ne vedo da so del sumljivih transakcij 
in to ugotovijo šele kasneje ko postanejo del preiskav. Prav kompleksnost same 
verige, ki predstavlja visoko tveganje, prinese tudi ogromne zaslužke, v primeru, da 
so utaje uspešno izvedene (House of Lords, 2007, str. 9).  
- Navzkrižno izdajanje računov (angl. Contra-trading) se navezuje na shemo davčnega 
vrtiljaka, le da vsebuje še dodatne transakcije. Razlika je ta da je polovica transakcij 
popolnoma legalnih, vendar ustvarjenih s tem namenom da prikrijejo ilegalne 
transakcije. Tako omogočijo MT da izvršijo svoj glavni cilj, utajo DDV (European 
Commission, 2018, str. 12, 13).  
Predstavitev najpomembnejših primerov goljufij z DDV je analizirana v treh delih. Prvi del 
podrobno analizira t.i. mutacijo treh različnih primerov na trgu emisij. V drugem delu je 
opisani največji zločin, ki se je zgodil na trgu emisijskih dovolilnic ter širjenje na področje 
pranja denarja. V zadnjem delu so predstavljene goljufije z DDV, relevantne za trg elektrike 
in plina ter potrdil o izvoru. Čeprav gre za zelo redke javne primere na področju elektrike in 
plina, pa obstajajo primeri, ki so se pojavili v letu 2019, kar nakazuje na nenehno prisotnost 
goljufij na področju DDV na vseh štirih energetskih proizvodih, ki so pomembni za to 
disertacijo. 
Prvi primer je poimenovan po glavnem izvršitelju DDV utaj, Sandeep Singh Dosanjh-u (v 
nadaljevanju Dosanjh). Ta primer je služil kot precedens, saj je bil prvi znani primer MTIC 
utaj z obsodbo na področju trgovanja z emisijskimi dovolilnicami. Prevara se je začela 20. 
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januarja 2009 in trajala vse do 6. maja 2009. Dosanjh, imenovan tudi glavni mojster za 
goljufijo MTIC z emisijskimi dovolilnicami, je v 69 dneh ukradel več kot 41 milijonov evrov 
iz davčne blagajne Velike Britanije. Emisijske dovolilnice, ponujene pod tržno ceno, so bile 
v nekaj minutah prenesene v investicijske banke ter druge energetske družbe. Sledenje 
ukradenega DDV je bilo opaženo v bankah na Novi Zelandiji, v Avstraliji, Hong Kongu itd. 
(Ainsworth, 2016a, str. 4). Dosanjh je bil aretiran 19. avgusta 2009, skupaj z drugimi šestimi 
osebami, ki so bile vpletene v goljufijo (Ainsworth, 2016, str. 15). Sodišče je ugotovilo, da 
bi morala vpletena podjetja, ki so sodelovala v transakcijah, kljub goljufiji, ki so jo izvršili 
Dosanjh in njegovi sodelavci, posvetiti več pozornosti postopku dobrega poznavanja svojih 
strank (angl. know your customer - KYC). Druga ugotovitev sodišča je poudarila, da se lahko 
takšne goljufije hitro preselijo na druge dobrine, in je še posebej v energetskem sektorju 
sprožila preplah med evropskimi energetskimi združenji. 
Drug primer se navezuje na združenje Citibank. Ainsworth (2016b, str. 2) nakazuje, da gre 
v tem primeru za prehodni primer. Glavna dejavnost Citibank je bila v mesecu juliju 2009. 
V registru Velike Britanije je bilo kupljenih približno 7.580.000 emisijskih dovolilnic, kjer je 
bilo več kot 70 odstotkov prodanih znotraj EU, preostale dovolilnice pa so bile prodane 
podjetjem v Veliki Britaniji. Največji prenos iz Velike Britanije se je zgodil v francoski 
register, nato pa so se emisijske dovolilnice prodale na francoski borzi BlueNext. Najbolj 
zanimivo je dejstvo, da te transakcije verjetno ne bi vzbudile suma za preiskavo. Eden od 
možnih razlogov za preiskavo Citibank je bila povezava s podjetjem KO Brokers in nakup 
1.853.000 dovoljenj, ki jih je Citibank opravila med 69-dnevnimi goljufijami primera 
Dosanjh. Drugi razlog so bile visoke cene v mesecu juniju in juliju 2009. Takrat so nizozemski 
in francoski organi že ukrepali, da bi preprečili goljufije z MTIC, Velika Britanija pa je šele 
kasneje uvedla mehanizme za preprečitev goljufij. Takoj zatem je aktivnost Citibank na trgu 
z emisijskimi dovolilnicami padla, kar nakazuje povezavo z umetnim trgom. Tretjič, Citibank 
je bila drugi največji kupec emisijskih dovoljenj na britanskem trgu. Prvi največji kupec je 
bila Deutsche Bank. Dejstvo, da je preiskava tako hitro povezala sumljiva trgovanja s 
Citibank kot tudi v spodnjem opisanem primeru z Deutsche Bank, kaže da je britanski davčni 
urad sledil poti goljufije. 
Tretji primer se nanaša na vpletenost Deutsche Bank v goljufijo z emisijskimi dovolilnicami. 
Kot že omenjeno je Dosanjh prodajal dovoljenja tako Citibank kot tudi Deutsche Bank. Dva 
pomembna elementa, zaradi katerih se je goljufija razvila v Nemčiji sta: 1) v Nemčiji ni bilo 
nobenega podjetja ali osebe, ki bi banki zagotovila tako velike količine emisijskih dovolilnic, 
2) spoznanje zaposlenih, da ne potrebujejo dobaviteljev dovolilnic, temveč lahko sami 
nadzirajo trg emisijskih dovolilnic. To so storili z ustanovitvijo podjetja, ki je vsakodnevno 
prodajalo dovoljenja določenim strankam pod tržno ceno. Ti elementi so predstavljali 
preobrat v goljufiji MTIC, saj se je ta preusmerila iz posameznih trgovcev na institucijo. 
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Zaposleni v Deutsche Bank so namerno trgovali z dovoljenji, ki so bili že pred tem del 
goljufive verige (Ainsworth, 2010c, str. 6). 
Opredeljen kot zločin stoletja, ki je v sodobnem času prinesel največ škode na finančnih in 
energetskih trgih, se je zgodil med letoma 2008 in 2009 na pariški platformi za izmenjavo 
energetskih dobrin – BlueNext. Tudi danes je tako imenovana goljufija Bluenext še vedno v 
središču številnih analiz in raziskav kot tudi dokumentarnih filmov. Na pariškem sodišču se 
je 2. maja 2016 začelo sojenje 12 osebam, obtoženim vpletenosti v goljufijo Bluenext. 
Sojenje je obravnavalo izgubo zaradi davčnih utaj, v znesku približno 5 milijard evrov, samo 
v Franciji je bilo utajenih 1,6 milijarde evrov. Transakcije emisijskih dovolilnic so potekale 
po zgoraj opisani shemi davčnih vrtiljakov, povezane pa so tudi s pranjem denarja ter 
financiranjem terorizma. Od treh voditeljev goljufije sta bila na sojenju prisotna dva, tretji 
je bil umorjen leta 2010, šest oseb je zbežalo v Izrael. Kljub sojenju in identifikaciji vpletenih 
oseb večina denarja ni bila najdena. Goljufi so uporabljali različna podjetja za prenašanje 
denarja preko mednarodnih shem med Ciprom, Latvijo in Hongkongom (Mazoue, 2016). 
Frunza (2010, str. 5 in 15) poskuša razložiti in predstaviti analitična dejstva, zakaj goljufije 
na trgu emisijskih dovolilnic niso odkrili skoraj dve polni leti. Eden prvih razlogov je narava 
emisijskih kuponov, ki so imeli dvojni status, kot finančni instrument ter kot osnovne 
surovine, kar pomeni, da so se finančni regulatorji manj osredotočili na nadzor te dobrine. 
Drug razlog je pomanjkanje koordinacije in sodelovanja med državami članicami ter 
svetovna finančna kriza leta 2009, kjer so se morali finančni regulatorji spoprijeti s krizo na 
nepremičninskem trgu. 
So Young (2017, str. 5) poroča ter analizira dva primera, na trgu z električno energijo in trgu 
s plinom. Primera je odkrila davčna uprava iz Norveške, ki je zaključila, da so izgube 
omenjenih goljufij DDV znašale približno 60 milijonov evrov. Goljufije, povezane s trgom 
električne energije, so se dogajale od leta 2013 do 2014, na trgu s plinom pa v letu 2015. 
Oba primera sta povezana in imata svoje začetke na trgu z emisijskimi dovolilnicami. Spodaj 
so v petih korakih povzeti načini delovanja goljufije v primeru električne energije, brez 
pravih imen vpletenih podjetij, ki niso bila nikoli objavljena. Prvi korak je bila ustanovitev 
podjetij v različnih državah članicah. Drugič, z električno energijo se je trgovalo v državi A, 
ki je drugačna od tiste s sedežem v preostalih ustanovljenih podjetij v prvem koraku. Tretjič, 
lažno izdajanje računov je bilo opravljeno v državi EU B, skupaj s pranjem denarja na 
Norveškem. Četrtič, elektrika, s katero se je trgovalo v državi X, je bila pod nadzorom ene 
od družb, ustanovljenih v prvem koraku, ki je nato izginila iz države B. Petič, MT v državi B 
je nadaljeval s prodajo ter od posrednikov zbiral DDV, ki ga nato ni plačal iz predhodno 
izdanega računa. Nazadnje so posredniki prodali električno energijo drugim borzam 
električne energije. V tem primeru goljufij z vrtiljaki ni bilo potrebno več izvajati, ker je blago 
mogoče znova kupiti na borzi. Zaključimo lahko, da tudi potem, ko je bilo mogoče določiti 
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korake trgovanja in transakcij, končnega cilja manjkajočega DDV ni bilo možno odkriti (So 
Young, 2017, str. 6). 
V povezavi s potrdili o izvoru so prav tako relevantne informacije norveškega davčnega 
organa, ki trdi, da kriminalci uporabljajo potrdila o izvoru kot orodje za goljufije z DDV tudi 
zunaj Norveške. To izjavo podpira norveški operater prenosnih sistemov, kjer se je več kot 
30 tujih podjetij poskušalo pridružiti registru za trgovanje z potrdili o izvoru. Ta podjetja so 
večinoma registrirana v EU, nekaj tudi v Združenih arabskih emiratih. Davčni organi se 
dobro zavedajo, da zaradi visokih cen potrdil o izvoru v zadnjih letih le ta postajo privlačen 
trg za prevarante. Analize kažejo, da gre za zvišanje cen okoli 200 % od jeseni 2017. Še bolj 
zaskrbljujoč pa je podatek, da skoraj nobena država članica nima implementiranega 
mehanizma za obrnjene davčne utaje (Reverse Charge Mechanism), v nadaljevanju RCM 
(Vilnes, 2019). 
Nadaljnje so obravnavane možne rešitve goljufij na področju DDV z ločitvijo med 
obstoječimi (že implementiranimi) in neobstoječimi (predvsem tehnološko zasnovanimi) 
rešitvami. Ena izmed ključnih ter že implementiranih rešitev je RCM. Izvajanje RCM v 
državah članicah ter nadaljnji predlogi predstavljajo rešitve, ki temeljijo na izboljšanju 
obstoječega sistema. Vsaka predstavljena rešitev nadalje glavne prednosti in slabosti. 
Predlog splošnega izvajanja RCM je bil predmet številnih razprav, najnovejši pa je Predlog 
direktive Sveta, ki ga je 25. maja 2018 pripravila EK (European Commission, 2018). Glavne 
spremembe predloga so razširiti možnost uporabe RCM ter uporabiti mehanizem za hitro 
odzivanje (v nadaljevanju QRM – Quick Reaction Mechanism) za boj proti goljufijam. Slednji 
je najhitrejši postopek, ki omogoča državam članicam, da uvedejo RCM v primerjavi s 
standardnim postopkom iz člena 199a. Glavna sprememba za dobrini elektrike in plina je 
torej podaljšati obdobje uporabe RCM do 30. junija 2022. Predlog je predlagal črtanje 
zahteve za najmanj dve leti za uporabo RCM, kar se je pokazalo kot resna ovira za države 
članice, ki so želele uvesti RCM v letu 2017. Poleg tega so v obrazložitvenem memorandumu 
omenjena dva glavna zakonodajna predloga. Prvič, upravno sodelovanje pri krepitvi 
sodelovanja med državami članicami ter drugič, izvajanje osnovnega temelja za 
enostavnejši sistem DDV v EU. Splošni cilj memoranduma je obravnavati goljufije na 
področju DDV na doslednejši način med državami članicami na podlagi njihovih povratnih 
informacij. 
Tehnološke rešitve so naslednja ponujena rešitev. Ainsworth (2014, str. 8) opisuje 
izmenjavo digitalnih računov kot eno izmed najboljših, vendar tehnološko intenzivnih 
sistemov za nadzor nad DDV. Gre za sistem, ki uporablja šifriranje računov za zaščito 
transakcijske izmenjave podatkov med prodajalcem in kupcem. Glavna prednost sistema je 
preverjanje računov v realnem času, kar pomeni, da gre za zelo koristno orodje za 
preprečevanje MTIC goljufij. Druga tehnološka rešitev za preprečevanje goljufij, ki jo je 
opredelil Ainsworth (2018, str. 17), je t.i. VATCoin. Po svoji naravi je VATCoin zelo podoben 
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Bitcoin-u, prvi kripto valuti. Razlika je v tem, da VATCoin temelji na davku in ni predmet 
špekulacij, temveč deluje kot fiksni redni davek in ni javen, kot je Bitcoin. Danes obstajajo 
različna mnenja o tem, ali naj bo veriga VATCoin zasebna ali javna. Ne glede na to, katera 
je primernejša, transakcije potekajo po shemi: X pošilja Y število DDV kovancev do Z 
(Ainsworth, 2018, str. 18). EC se že od uvedbe enotnega trga spopada s sistemom DDV in 
njegovimi napakami, sistem Blockchain pa bi lahko bil pot do novega izboljšanega sistema. 
Sistem VLN predlaga, da vsak račun vsebuje šifrirano varno številko, ki je edinstvena za 
vsako transakcijo. Sistem je pod nadzorom enega centralnega računalniškega sistema, ki ga 
verjetno upravlja vlada, ki izvaja avtomatizirane potrditve in zahteve (Bukhsh & Weigand, 
2015, str. 3). Real time VAT (hereinafter RTvat) sistem, kot že povedano v samem imenu je 
cilj takega sistema izvajati nadzor v čim bolj realnem času. To se naredi tako, da se njegova 
obdavčitev spremeni na datum poravnave, namesto obdavčitve na računu, kot je izvedeno 
trenutno (Bukhsh & Weigand, 2015, str. 5). 
Kot dodana vrednost k že obstoječim rešitve so prikazane možnosti, ki jih predlagajo 
strokovnjaki z evropskih institucij ter energetskih regulatorjev. Prva celostna rešitev je  
aktivni nadzor trga, ki ponuja možnost centraliziranega evropskega nadzora ali uskladitev 
DDV za vse države članice. Centraliziran evropski nadzor se tako osredotoča na stanje ko se 
goljufija že pojavi na trgu ter vpeljuje metode s katerimi je možno najhitreje odkriti 
prevarante. Osnove za to so že oblikovane v strategiji tržnega nadzora, s katero evropska 
agencija za koordinacijo energetskih regulatorjev zajema različne vidike nadzora evropskih 
energetskih trgov. Izhodišče je zagotoviti najboljšo možno pokritost veleprodajnih 
energetskih trgov EU in s tem zmanjšati tveganje zaradi neodkritih kršitev evropskih uredb 
(REMIT Regulative). Ovire za omenjeno strategijo so sledeče: pomanjkanje človeških virov, 
zapleti pravne narave zaradi nesoglasja med državami članicami, različni vidiki energetskih 
regulatorjev, kakovost podatkov. Druga kategorija aktivnega tržnega nadzora ponujena s 
strani strokovnjakov energetskega trga je uskladitev DDV za vse države članice. Enoten DDV 
bi popolnoma odpravil težave s čezmejnimi goljufijami, saj bi bile vse države članice 
upravičene do enakega deleža davka, ki ga plačajo udeleženci na trgu v eni skupni mreži. 
Ostala vprašanja, kot so nacionalna goljufija, bi še vedno bila mogoča, vendar bi bila s 
takšnim sistemom odpravljena goljufija z vrtiljakom in manjkajoč trgovec. Glavni problem 
usklajevanja davkov kot rešitve za boj proti goljufijam na področju DDV je počasno 
usklajevanje med državami članicami in nepripravljenost uskladitve njihovih davčnih 
stopenj zaradi možne prilagoditve nižjih stopenj z državami članicami, ki uvajajo višje 
davčne stopnje kot druge države članice. Druga celostna rešitev se nanaša na sodelovanje, 
ki ima prav tako dve predlagani možnosti, sodelovanje na nacionalni ravni in sodelovanje 
na evropski ravni. Najboljša praksa sodelovanje na nacionalni ravni izpostavlja čimprej 
obvestiti ustrezne davčne organe, če obstaja sum vedenja, povezanega z goljufijo na 
področju DDV. Vse ustrezne informacije v zvezi s potencialnim sumom je potrebno 
posredovati ter vzpostaviti komunikacijski kanal med regulativnimi organi za energetiko in 
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davčnimi organi oz. ostalimi organi, ki se ukvarjajo s spremljanjem trgov. To je še bolj 
pomembno zaradi dejstva, da bi lahko dva različna organa začela s preiskavo, kar lahko 
privede tudi do dveh vzporednih preiskav. Te morajo biti v vsakem primeru koordinirane, 
da ne pride do dvojnega sankcioniranja. Problemi tega predloga so vzpostavitev 
okrepljenega sodelovanja med državami članicami in premalo zaupanja med različnimi 
organi. To bi lahko spremenili z izgradnjo varnih komunikacijskih kanalov, kjer je to 
potrebno oz. kjer se izvaja več čezmejnih transakcij. Sodelovanje na ravni EU je pomembno 
zlasti kadar goljufije z DDV zadevajo več jurisdikcij. Podobno kot na nacionalni ravni obstaja 
potreba po sodelovanju ter zbiranju podatkih na evropski ravni. Sodelovanje na evropski 
ravni bi omogočilo pridobitev podatkov iz skupnega vira, vzpostavljenega na evropski ravni 
ter izvajanje komunikacija z evropskim pristopom. Očiten problem tega pristopa je 
pomanjkanje kompetenc na evropski ravni. Po analizi mnenj različnih strokovnjakov nam 
rezultati vprašalnika ponujajo dve različni perspektivi, RCM kot najboljši mehanizem za 
preprečitev davčnih utaj do evropskega pristopa, ki bi zagotovil najboljše orodje za 
odkrivanje davčnih utaj. Pomembno je izpostaviti, da večina anketirancev meni, da še 
vedno ni na voljo dovolj informacij, ki bi omogočale vpogled v stanje na energetskih trgih. 
Dejstvo je da so goljufije z DDV prizadele tržne udeležence na evropskem veleprodajnem 
energetskem trgu zaradi nepripravljenosti odgovornih regulatorjev. Ukrepi za ublažitev so 
bili izvedeni šele, ko so se pojavili primeri, ki so predstavljali ogromno škodo za 
davkoplačevalce ter pritegnili medijsko pozornost. Pri raziskavi v tej nalogi takšni primeri 
služijo kot dokaz širjenja goljufij na področju DDV v Evropi. Analiza raziskav primerov kaže, 
kako hitro se goljufije preusmerijo od posameznih trgovcev do visoko cenjenih subjektov 
kot so banke in mednarodna podjetja. Pri teh goljufijah je prisoten element hitre reakcije, 
ki omogoča skrivanje goljufivih verig. Prva ugotovitev se nanaša na dejstvo, da so bili 
uvedeni predpisi in ukrepi v zvezi z DDV implementirani z izjemno hitrostjo, kar je povzročilo 
neusklajenost in nedoslednost med državami članicami. Vse do danes problema ni mogoče 
zlahka odkriti, niti ga ni mogoče učinkovito preprečiti. Prav zaradi tega se je pojavilo veliko 
rešitev za reševanje obstoječe grožnje z DDV. RCM je splošna rešitev, predlagana za 
reševanje tekočih vprašanj, ki se pojavljajo pri shemah davčnih vrtiljakov. Kljub temu RCM 
ni edina rešitev, ki bi lahko preprečila goljufije z DDV. Glede na različne vrste verig goljufij, 
ki so bile opisane v tej disertaciji, nekatere predstavljene rešitve predstavljajo boljši pristop 
za rešitev obstoječe vrzeli DDV v EU na energetskem trgu. 
Najboljši način za odpravo goljufij na področju DDV bi moral slediti preprosti in dolgoročni 
rešitvi. Zato je treba upoštevati pristop, predlagam v prvi hipotezi, sodelovanje med 
državami članicami. Od številnih prestavljenih rešitev je večina primerna za odpravo DDV 
le, če se uporablja sinhroniziran pristop med državami članicami. Ta predstavlja pogoj za 
vsako naslednjo rešitev. Druga stopnja se nanaša na kombinacija že obstoječih ter novih 
rešitev. Naslednja ugotovitev tako kaže, da je potrebno slediti evropskemu pristopu, zlasti 
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kadar gre za zbiranje podatkov in nadzor. Takšen pristop bi bilo najbolje kombinirati z že 
izvedenim RCM. Kombinacija z obstoječo rešitvijo, kot je RCM, z neizvedeno rešitvijo, kot 
je evropski nadzor, je po opravljeni analizi mnenj strokovnjakov identificirana kot najboljša 
pot za reševanje davčnih utaj DDV. Nadaljnje je potrebno izpostaviti da je za izvedbo rešitve 
kot je evropski pristop zahtevano nacionalno usklajevanje in šele nato potrditev na evropski 
ravni. Kljub dolgemu in zapletenemu postopku bi uvedba le tega predstavljala najmočnejše 
orodje za boj proti goljufijam z DDV, zlasti v primeru manjkajočega trgovca. Države se 
morajo prav tako zavedati, da se goljufije nenehno razvijajo in prilagajajo trgu, zato je 
koordiniran pristop na evropski ravni več kot nujen. 
Ključne besede: Davčne utaje DDV, energetski trg, emisijske dovolilnice, pojav izginjajočega 
trgovca, davčni vrtiljak, mehanizem obrnjene davčne obveznosti.  
xvii 
 
ABSTRACT 
The main focus of this master's thesis is the threat posed by the loss of control of the 
European institutions and the individual national authorities over the current tax system 
related to the energy market. This threat arises from a lack of coordination and cooperation 
between Member States. Therefore, the aim of the thesis is to investigate the strengths 
and weaknesses of the EU tax system related to the energy market, and to present the 
current situation by analysing various cases. 
The thesis uses a descriptive research method and an analytical approach. The descriptive 
method describes concepts and facts according to the classification method. The data has 
been obtained from foreign primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include 
the directives of European institutions, agencies, etc. The secondary sources include expert 
articles, reports and research from relevant institutions, as well as relevant newspapers. In 
the empirical part, the data has been obtained from two conducted interviews and a 
survey. 
The VAT rules and measures currently in place have been implemented extremely fast, 
causing inconsistencies between Member States. The solution proposed in the first 
hypothesis, cooperation between Member States, represents one of the best long-term 
ways to eliminate VAT fraud. On the basis of improved cooperation, which is a prerequisite 
for any further solutions, a European approach should be followed, especially when it 
comes to data collection and surveillance. A combination of the existing and new 
approaches has been identified as the ideal solution. 
The need for a coordinated EU approach to reducing tax evasion in the energy field has also 
been highlighted by the largest energy exchanges. The EU should react much faster and 
more transparently in case of tax evasion. Centralising control in a European agency that 
already controls part of the energy market would be the best approach to detecting tax 
evasion, as well as performing analyses, which could serve as evidence against fraudsters 
in legal proceedings. 
Keywords: VAT evasion, energy commodity sector, emission allowances, missing trader 
intra-community phenomenon, tax carousel, reverse charge mechanism. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This study focuses on Value Added Tax (hereinafter VAT) fraud in relation to European 
Union (hereinafter EU) energy markets. At the beginning, VAT fraud was connected to high 
value commodities such as cars, phones, computer chips and luxuries. Today, we see the 
spread of VAT fraud into other areas where fraudsters, if successful, can benefit to an even 
greater extent and where trading is no longer physical but part of intangible markets, 
dramatically increasing trading speed and traded volumes (Podlipnik, 2012, p. 458). 
Emission allowances are one of those goods where trading and transferring is concluded 
only through electronic transactions, therefore making it more difficult to trace and prove 
fraudulent activity. With the elimination of trading barriers between Member States 
(hereinafter MS) of the EU, trading for electricity and gas has increased, but at the same 
time, those goods became a target for fraudsters. One of the top reported cases took place 
in the year 2009 when the French market and trading platform BlueNext S.A1 (hereinafter 
BlueNext) collapsed, due to large losses related to VAT fraud (Berrittella, 2012, p. 8). Other 
relevant cases are Dosajnh, Citibank and Deutsche Bank, representing a three-part 
mutation of VAT fraud chains that resulted in another batch of extremely high losses for 
financial authorities. The common denominator in these cases is that they were all part of 
missing trader intra-community (hereinafter MTIC) fraud. MTIC is a fraud that takes 
advantage of European legislation that allows trading across MS to be VAT free. Only when 
large fraud cases occurred, the EU started to realise the need for amendments on Council 
Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax (hereinafter VAT 
Directive). 
With the implementation of the VAT Directive, the EU wanted to implement a unified tax 
system in order to prevent frauds from happening. Due to the large damage caused by 
MTIC cases, the EU MS proposed to implement the Reverse Charge Mechanism (hereinafter 
RCM) as a measure to combat VAT fraud, but the implementation only took place in certain 
countries and only for specific commodities. Therefore, inconsistency within cross border 
trading materialised. EU cross border trading is especially present in the energy field. 
Fraudsters first entered into the trading of emission allowances that later on spread onto 
electricity and gas markets (Lamensch & Ceci, 2018, p. 17). Both the EU and the energy 
exchanges have been calling for a coordinated approach and implementation of RCM in all 
MS (Europex, 2018). What worried the European exchanges and escalated their fast 
response was the disintegration of the market as a result of VAT losses due to MTIC fraud 
                                                            
1BlueNext was a trading exchange platform that was established in December 2007 and closed permanently 
in December 2012. Its main activities included trading spot and derivatives trading, mainly of EUAs and 
certified emissions reductions, retrieved from: https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/ private/ 
snapshot. asp?privcapId=59054767.   
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that was estimated to EUR 5 billion between 2009 and 2010 in the so-called crime of the 
century (Lamensch & Ceci, 2018, p. 17). After the implementation of RCM in some MS, 
mostly in the field of emissions allowances, the threat of VAT fraud was eliminated locally. 
However, it appeared again because of cross border trading with MS situated in 
jurisdictions which did not implement the RCM.  
The Master’s thesis aims to prove or disprove the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: An increased cooperation and knowledge sharing of the various involved 
institutions could overcome shortcomings in existing VAT collection, using the already 
available but dispersed information. 
Hypothesis 2: A centralised control across Europe would be the most effective tool to 
prevent VAT fraud and to reduce the VAT gap. 
In order to prove or disprove the hypothesis postulated above, this thesis examines the 
introduction of the widely used RCM that was put in place by many EU countries as a 
mitigating measure, thereby following a deductive scientific approach. The success of the 
RCM is being evaluated as well as its shortcomings. Complementarily, a standardised 
questionnaire is utilised to incorporate expert insight on the limit of this concept following 
an inductive approach. Finally, an alternative methodology will be presented that could 
help to immediately detect and prevent VAT fraud in specific energy wholesale products. 
Next, this thesis proceeds to a discussion of the expert input collected through the two 
interviews and the questionnaire.  The main sources of this thesis are the evaluation of 
primary sources of EU legislation, case law from the Court of Justice of the European Union 
and other EU institutions, as well as working papers, academic articles and namely the 
publications of researchers such as Ainsworth, Frunza, Lamensch & Ceci, etc. 
In the second chapter, the thesis introduces an overview of VAT and VAT fraud, describing 
history and development and continues with a general overview of trading schemas of 
carbon emissions and trading strategies of electricity and gas commodities. 
The third chapter focuses on the most common VAT frauds schemes taking place in the 
energy market, and the development of so-called MTIC or carousel fraud. A detailed 
description of how MTIC frauds are executed, explicating practical examples of how 
fraudsters implementing MTIC fraud were caught is presented in the fourth chapter. 
Carefully selected cases provide a detailed description in the area of emission allowances, 
which is where the biggest losses occurred and where the information is publicly provided. 
In the electricity and gas sector, the cases references are already or will be anonymised. 
The fifth chapter provides possible solutions to VAT fraud starting with the RCM as the main 
European approach to combat VAT fraud. The second and third parts add other non-
European approaches, which are equally relevant for the VAT fraud prevention and are 
mainly related to technological systems. The sixth chapter focus on the non-implemented 
3 
 
solutions, based on the results of the gathered experts’ views that could increase the 
efficiency of measures used in the battle against VAT fraud. The seventh chapter addresses 
the hypothesis and provides links for further research. The last chapter provides concluding 
remarks.   
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2 THE HISTORY OF VAT FRAUD AND ITS IMPLICATIONS TO 
ENERGY TRADING 
2.1 HISTORY OF VAT AND THE FIRST ATTEMPTS TO EXPLOIT IT 
Although this chapter is mainly dedicated to VAT fraud on energy market, a brief 
explanation of the general history of the VAT establishment and its rules is necessary. VAT 
is a comparably modern tax that developed and evolved in Europe after First World War, 
but was at that time introduced in only in few countries in Europe. Today, due to 
globalisation, the dissemination of VAT system has spread into over 130 countries 
worldwide. In the 20th century, the rise of VAT systems is seen in most of the EU MS. In the 
context of the VAT in the EU, it is important to mention the following milestones (De la 
Feria, 2010, p. 25): 
The first phase of changes started in 1967 and 1977, when the EU countries agreed on a 
common package of tax rules for services and goods, which were also the basis for the 
establishment of EU VAT system. Those were the first steps towards the establishment of 
European tax integration.  
The next milestone was achieved in 1993 with the completion of the internal market and 
when tax supervision between the EU borders was abolished. The main change was 
supposed to be the replacement of the destination-based VAT system with the origin-based 
VAT system, but instead the result was a transitional VAT system for a limited period of 
four years. One of the administrative measures introduced was the VAT Information 
Exchange System (hereinafter VIES)2 with the purpose to mitigate the threat of VAT fraud. 
The results after four years showed the difficulties in implementing any changes and the 
transitional measures were therefore extended to the year 2000, when the EC presented a 
proposal with four main objectives (De la Feria, 2010, p. 25–28):  
1) ‘Simplification of current EU VAT rules; 
2) Modernisation of those same rules;  
3) More uniform application of current rules; and 
4) Stronger administrative cooperation’. 
The above-mentioned rules and amendments to the VAT system were not enough. The 
complex system resulted in the spread of VAT fraud and the EC acknowledged that the 
current system with its complexity and many shortcomings caused the VAT system to be 
susceptible to fraud, and especially carousel fraud.  
                                                            
2 VIES as defined by the EC is ‘is a search engine’ or a tool that combines all data collected or retrieved from 
national VAT databases, retrieved from: https://europa.eu/youreurope/business/taxation/vat/check-vat-
number-vies/index_en.htm.  
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The next important milestone in 2006, implemented the VAT Directive with an aim to 
define EU’s VAT legislation in force. The establishment of rules for common VAT system 
was very recent, which meant that the EU had to deal with many obstacles in regards of 
coordination between MS to establish a common VAT system. The fact is that cross-border 
VAT fraud appeared with the elimination of borders and the EU has had to focus its 
attention towards prevention of fraud even more. On top of that, the EU was unable reach 
consensus on the future direction of the VAT system ever since it was established, until 
very recently when an Action Plan on VAT3 was adopted by EC on 7 April 2016. The Action 
Plan is highly focused on ongoing VAT fraud and reports on losses of EUR 170 billion due to 
the VAT gap4 as well as EUR 50 billion due to cross border VAT fraud (European 
Commission, 2016a). In general, the Action Plan is focused towards the establishment of a 
‘single VAT area’ or ‘Definitive VAT Regime’. Instead of the so-called dual transitional 
system, the Action Plan proposes the following replacement: ‘a single ‘intra-Union supply 
of goods’ linked to the transportation of the goods and to be taxed in, and at the rate of, 
the MS where the transport of goods ends’ (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2018, p. 2). This 
modernisation would ensure equal treatment between domestic and intra-community 
transactions and therefore has strong support among experts. Nevertheless, the changes 
mandate a complete reform of tax system, which is a very difficult task especially when all 
MS should implement changes accordingly.  
According to Podlipnik (2012, p. 458), VAT fraud within the EU can be traced back to 1993 
on the Luxemburg border where criminals sought to exploit Luxembourg's zero percent tax 
rate. The smugglers of gold sold the goods to other EU markets with tax included and the 
EU had to establish a special scheme for prevention of tax fraud. Other goods that followed 
as a target of VAT fraud were those with high values and low weights, such as mobile 
phones or computer components. The second type of VAT fraud involved vehicles, wood, 
alcohol, oil, oil derivate and finally, intangible goods such as emission allowances, and 
software licences etc. Frunza (2016, p. 2) highlights that the most common and easy 
fraudulent schemes involve basic food products, as well as cars and car parts. These types 
of fraud were very quickly expanded because of the everyday use of the products. 
Nevertheless, the biggest losses due to VAT fraud happened in the field of emission 
allowances and it was only when that was discovered that the focus became wider and 
reached public attention. More details on the most well-known VAT fraud on emission 
allowances are presented in the section on European trade systems and its vulnerabilities.  
                                                            
3 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European 
Economic and Social Committee on an action plan on VAT – Towards a single EU VAT area – Time to decide 
(COM(2016) 148 final). 
4 The VAT gap definition proposed by the EC is ‘the difference between the estimated VAT revenues that 
Member States expect to receive ('VAT Total Tax Liability' or VTTL) and the amount of VAT actually collected’, 
retrieved from: https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-5788_en.htm 
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2.2 EXISTING SITUATION 
In 1993, a transitional VAT system was adopted due to lack of agreement between MS. In 
practice, this means two different transactions of EU cross border goods. The first 
transaction relates to an intra community supply that is VAT exempt in the MS of origin, or 
in other words when the supplier does not charge the VAT. Figure 1 as shown below, 
describes the situation when Company C in MS 1 performs a supply deal to Company D in 
MS 2 without charging VAT. The second transaction relates to intra community acquisition 
of goods that are taxed, in other words self-accounting of customer supplies, which is 
similar to the reverse charge. The transaction in Figure 1 below between Company D and 
the treasury of MS 2 shows the VAT return. The transactions between A to B, B to C and D 
to E are all taxed as they apply domestic tax rules that were also implemented in the 
previous tax system (European Commission, 2017, p. 3). 
Figure 1: Transitional VAT system 
 
Source: European Commission (2017, p. 17) 
The main issues of transitional system as identified by impact assessment study of the EC 
were the following (European Commission, 2017, p. 20): 
- Huge losses due to intra community cross border VAT fraud, 
- Complex VAT system.  
The connection between transition system and missing trader fraud identifies huge losses 
for citizens, businesses and specific MS, which represent an issue on all levels. Huge efforts 
have been made to try to eliminate fraud but with such a complex system, that is extremely 
difficult. Complex procedures and lengthy processes go hand in hand with development of 
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fraud. The fact that the current system has been in place for longer than originally expected 
and the extension of VAT system to new MS together with globalisation are the main 
reasons why authorities did not succeed in lowering of the spread of VAT fraud. The general 
conclusion is that all these changes require further adaptations or the new VAT system 
(ibid.). 
2.3 FUTURE OF THE VAT: DESTINATION VS ORIGIN PRINCIPLE 
In 2012, The Council of the European Union (hereinafter The Council) recognised the need 
for a more efficient VAT system, for its simplification, as well as for fiscal consolidation 
between MS. In addition, it also agreed on stronger objectives for dealing with tax evasion. 
Thus, recognising for the first time that the origin principle was no longer considered to be 
the most efficient system for the EU. One of the last issues raised was the technological 
developments that would improve resilience and fraud-proof VAT (Council of the European 
Union, 2012).  
Since then, the EU has been working towards the implementation of the system, based on 
the destination principle. As stated above the, origin-based system was never introduced 
since it would create competitive distortions in the market, but neither was the destination 
principle. Instead, the transitional system that was initially planned to endure for four years 
continues until today. In order to better understand the differences between both systems, 
the key features are presented below. The origin-based principle would introduce a system 
that would treat the whole market as a single country. Its main characteristics are (Puccio, 
2019, p. 2): 
- Cross border transactions would be taxed in accordance with the tax of the country 
of origin, which would mean that the input tax would be deducted by traders, same 
as in domestic transaction;  
- A necessary clearing house that would reallocate tax collected via different steps of 
transactions; and 
- A harmonisation of VAT would be necessary for that kind of system, since it would 
otherwise encourage migration of business to MS with lower VAT rates and 
therefore create distortions on the market. That is the reason why this system was 
never introduced.  
The destination-based principle (anticipated to be introduced in the 2020 has the following 
characteristics (Puccio, 2019, p. 3): 
- The supply of goods and services to be taxed in the country of destination that 
would achieve neutral international trade with zero-rated exports and with imports 
taxed on a basis of rates of domestic supplies; 
- More simplified and robust system; 
- VAT gap reduction by EUR 40 billion, especially in relation to fraud; and 
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- Less business compliance costs, by EUR 1 billion.  
2.4 VAT AND MTIC GAP ESTIMATES 
In order to better understand, the differences between methods for tackling the VAT gap, 
the two approaches known as top-down and bottom-up are further explained. The top-
down approach, known as macro approach, involves using aggregated data to signal 
anomalies in economic flows and is known as an indirect approach. This is done by 
measuring economic variables. The bottom-up approach uses individual data from differing 
sources and uses statistical analysis to identify MTIC fraud as a first step and then 
determines the extent of non-compliance, as a second step. The approach is known as 
direct approach (European Commission, 2018b, p. 22). Authors, such as Borselli (2011, p. 
5) explain the bottom-up approach as a direct approach, based on auditing of data and its 
activities; and the top-down approach as indirect approach, which assume that national 
data is biased and that asymmetries can occur. Few recent approaches uses trade gap 
either in correlation with responsiveness or panel regression in order to estimate MTIC. 
The MS have also developed different approaches, mainly in relation to the two 
classifications methodologies above (European Commission, 2018b, p. 17). 
On September 2017, the EC issued a press release announcing losses in the amount of EUR 
152 billion, due to the VAT gap, in 2015. The press release calls for an urgent reform of the 
VAT system, which is dependent on the national governments that should reform and 
provide for more controlled cross border transactions (European Commission, 2017). The 
background of the publication lies in the ‘Study and Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU-28 
Member States: 2018 Final Report’, which measures and compares the VAT gap from 2012 
to 2016. The study provides for separate analysis of each country by different sectors, but 
the main outcome is that the 2016 VAT gap just slightly decreased from the previous years 
and jet is still amounted to EUR 145.4 billion. The 2018 VAT gap report shows the smallest 
gap of EUR 29 million (0.85 %) in Luxemburg and the largest gap of EUR 6,137 million (35.88 
%) in Romania. The study uses top-down approach when calculating the VAT gap. If the 
comparison is made between 2015 and 2016, a decrease of the VAT gap can be observed 
in twenty-two MS and an increase in six, but the concerning issue is that the difference of 
VAT gap between MS persist. That implies different national rules and approaches in 
tackling the VAT fraud (Institute for Advanced Studies, 2018, p. 16–17).  
In September 2019, the Institute for Advanced Studies issued a most recent report on the 
VAT gap. The below Figure 2 shows the percentage of the VAT gap for each MS, with the 
smallest gap of EUR 11 million (0.6 %) in Cyprus, of EUR 23 million (0.7 %) in Luxemburg 
and of EUR 654 million (1.5 %) Sweden. The largest gaps of EUR 6,413 million (35.5 %) in 
Romania, of EUR 7,339 million (33.6 %) in Greece and of EUR 1,119 million (25.3 %) in 
Lithuania. The largest decline in 2017 can be seen in the case of Malta, from 2016 EUR 71 
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million (13 %) of VAT gap to EUR 13 million (2 %). The reclassification of financial sector in 
2015 contributed to that change. In comparison between 2016 and 2017 data, the 25 MS 
saw a decrease in the VAT gap (the biggest decrease happened in Malta, Poland, Cyprus) 
and in only 3 MS (Latvia, Greece and Germany) an increase could be observed. The total 
tax gap compared to 2016 decreased and is EUR 137.5 million. The numbers presented 
above and in the Figure 2 are described in relative terms. In comparison with the nominal 
terms the VTTL increased for EUR 1,223 billion (2.9 %) (Institute for Advanced Studies, 2019, 
p. 16–17). 
Figure 2: VAT Gap as percentage in 28 Member States in the years 2016 and 2017 
 
Source: Institute for Advanced Studies (2019, p. 17) 
The numbers presented above are calculated as an ‘econometric analysis of VAT Gap 
determinants’ (Institute for Advanced Studies, 2019, p. 9), but it is important to mention 
that many methodologies exist and that almost every MS uses its own approach when 
calculating the VAT or more specifically the MTIC gap. Moreover, the report on MTIC Fraud 
Gap estimation methodologies provides a detailed overview and assessment of the 
approaches used across the EU and outlines only a few countries that actually calculated 
the size of MTIC fraud (European Commission, 2018b, p. 5). The calculations made are 
reporting on EUR 94 billion in 2014 due to MTIC fraud (Frunza, 2016, p. 1). In one of his 
previous works, Frunza (2010, p. 1) focuses on calculating losses limited only to the 
European carbon emissions market, which resulted in losses of EUR 1.3 billion during 2009. 
His econometric analysis is based on the statistical methods connected with mechanisms 
that explain market behaviour that allowed carbon fraud to take place and further 
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consequences. The analysis provides a deeper investigation that shows the effects of fraud 
on the market price, which is extremely important when identifying the VAT gap for the 
future. Moreover, the calibration of Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT)5 models were used in 
the see the impact on the market in the most effected months. The study took into 
consideration spot prices on the Bluenext exchange. The results presented by Frunza (2010, 
p. 12, 13) demonstrate the existence to market manipulation since price distortions are 
clearly visible by the statistical analysis. The APT models used provide valuable tools for the 
future analysis of trading system and issues of MTIC on gas and power markets.  
The proposed solution on the identification of VAT gap is in line with the hypothesis of this 
thesis, which is that there needs to be a common European approach to combatting the 
VAT gap and is also suggested in the MTIC Fraud Gap estimation methodologies (European 
Commission, 2018b, p. 38). The Transaction Network Analysis (hereinafter TNA) approach 
was proposed based on only a few MS calculating the VAT gap and in order to establish a 
platform, which would support EUROFISC6. The TNA follows a bottom-up approach and still 
allows for insights into the MTIC gap with its access to national aggregated data. It is 
important that the available data is similarly structured and is provided in the same 
environment. This would allow for comparison and proper assessment between MS. Since 
one of the main conclusions of the 2018 VAT Gap Report is that the MTIC gap is difficult to 
assess because of the complexity of this type of fraud, the TNA proposal can offer a good 
start. In addition, double counting is avoided with such approach and its connection to the 
VIES and EUROFISC would allow for very much needed centralized system (European 
Commission, 2018b, p. 39). The calculation of the MTIC gap itself is important for proper 
understanding of scale of the issue in comparison with the general VAT gap. After looking 
into methodologies proposed by different researches, a commonly organised and accepted 
approach by all MS would bring solutions to overcome many existing approaches, as well 
as to those MS who are unable to identify the VAT gap themselves. Frunza (2016, p. 22) 
after detailed analysis of MTIC gap calculates that 49 % of the total VAT fraud is due to 
MTIC VAT gap. His results show that countries, such as United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy 
had the highest MTIC VAT gap in 2014.    
                                                            
5 Arbitrage Pricing Theory is built on the assumption that the ‘prices of securities are driven by multiple 
factors, which could be grouped into macroeconomic or company-specific factors’, therefore not only market 
risk but other factors are included, which helps to identify sensitivity of certain security and its exposure to 
macroeconomic risks, retrieved from: https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/apt.asp.  
6 The EUROFISC network was established by a Regulation on administrative cooperation and combating VAT 
fraud (Council Regulation 904/2010 (OJ L268 of 12/10/2010, p.1) and officially launched on 10 November 
2010, retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/docs/body/2011-02-
07_eurofisc _pressrelease_en.pdf).  
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2.5 EUROPEAN TRADE SYSTEMS AND ITS VULNERABILITIES 
2.5.1 The European Union emissions trading system  
In 2013, Europol published a detailed guide on global carbon trading and crimes on the 
specific market. The carbon trading system, also called cap and trade regime has its basis 
in the Kyoto Protocol7, where a ‘cap’ means the limit set for a country or company of the 
total greenhouse emissions they can emit. The functioning of carbon trading is thus done 
with ‘units’ and each would represent one standardized carbon credit that is equal to one 
tonne of Carbon dioxide (hereinafter CO2) (Interpol, 2013, p. 2). This world’s fastest 
growing commodities market was valued at EUR 176 billion in 2011. The biggest trading 
scheme is currently the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (hereinafter EU ETS) that 
established its own allowances called European Union Allowances (hereinafter EUAs) 
(Interpol, 2012, p. 7). The EU-ETS with its downstream system imposes emission allowances 
for users rather than producers. EU-ETS is based on trading between individual emitters, 
the so-called polluters, which comprise of 11,428 installations in the MS. These installations 
operate within four main sectors, energy being one of them, listed in the Directive 
2009/29/CE of the European Parliament and Council of 23 April 2009 (European 
Commission, 2009). Further, Directive 2009/29/CE sets three important tasks for EU MS, 
deciding on the quantity of emissions allocated to the installations, drawing up lists of 
installations subject to emissions trading and on how to allocate the total quantity. These 
tasks should be recorded in the National Allocation Plan of specific MS, which as already 
stated in its name allocates the EUs allowances in each MS. From its implementation, 1 
January 2005, the EU-ETS is now in its third stage, which actually plans to abolish such 
allocation plans and adopt a centralised emissions cap instead. More specifically, emissions 
trading provides for several possibilities within the system on how polluters (which receive 
a number of emissions credits) can pay. The first possibility is in case the polluter does not 
use the whole allowance and can either save or sell his credits; secondly, the polluter uses 
its whole allowance and more, which leads him to but more credits from another polluter; 
and thirdly, the polluter can invest and earn credits (Berrittella, 2012, p. 3).   
The third current phase started in 2013 and runs until 2020. It is the longest trading period 
introducing substantial differences in comparison with the previous two stages that are 
based on the experience with the previous two systems. The main changes were focused 
on the establishment of centralised system (done with Union Registry), establishment of 
‘single EU-wide cap on allowances’ and other rules and benchmarks that encourage 
harmonisation and better functioning of EU-ETS (De Clara & Mayr, 2018, p. 4). In its third 
                                                            
7Kyoto Protocol, that entered into force on 15 February 2005, is the international agreement that attempts 
to emit greenhouse gases, retrieved from: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.   
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phase the EUAs transferred between taxable persons are considered as a supply of service, 
which means that they were taxable at the place of the recipient. Under the current 
schema, the EUAs are very susceptible for frauds. The reasons for this include their high 
value (between EUR 10 to 30) and being electronic goods, which makes them easily 
transferrable. Moreover, the EUAs had a zero VAT regime with trading inside the EU and 
the traders were able to reclaim VAT with same country counterparties. Another factor 
that make fraud quickly achievable was the existence of organised exchanges, such as 
Bluenext and Climex (Frunza, Guegan & Thiebaut, 2010, p. 4). With such big trading 
schemes, it is obvious to expect that it would be subject to many criminal activities, one of 
them being tax fraud. The selected court cases linked to tax fraud on carbon market are 
described in the chapter 4. 
In the 2018 revision, the fourth phase EU-ETS focus on the period from 2021 to 2030. The 
main features are (De Clara & Mayr, 2018, p. 10): 
- Annual reductions of EUAs to 2.2 %, done with market stability reserve mechanisms 
(a system that reduce EUAs surplus and helps to improve resilience of the whole 
EU-ETS), in short ‘increase the pace of emissions cuts’; 
- Continuing free allocation that enables competitiveness for sectors with carbon 
leakage risks; and  
- Funding mechanisms that helps industries as well as power sector to meet 
necessary challenges.  
No policy changes are expected for the EU-ETS system in the coming years. The 
expectations confirmed by the price trends show significant increase of EUR 20/tCO2 in 
2023, continuing to EUR 35/tCO2 towards the end of phase four. Then the prices are 
expected to decline due to emission reduction goal of fourth phase that is due to surplus 
of EUAs from the previous phase (De Clara & Mayr, 2018, p. 12–13). The EU-ETS 
improvements are also a positive aspect for lowering VAT fraud on carbon market together 
with national legislation changes that are described later on as a main prevention 
mechanism for fraud.   
2.5.2 Electricity and Gas trading systems 
According to Article 19 of the VAT Directive, both electricity and gas are treated as goods 
for VAT purposes. The difference with other goods is that electricity or gas cannot be 
touched, physically seen or even stored for longer periods. That makes it a somehow 
special commodity with specific trading rules applying for such commodity. The energy 
delivery runs according to a coding scheme in the EU energy market. This scheme identifies 
delivered amounts and delivered parties and the so-called Energy Identification Code 
(hereinafter EIC) is applied in all EU MS. Such identification codes are only given to the 
market participants after its registration with its own national authority. When the energy 
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is obtained via scheduling or when trading is performed, the delivery happens through the 
grid of the Transmission System Operator8. The trading can be either bilateral, via energy 
exchanges or via brokers. For that purpose, the EIC is necessary providing the nomination 
is done online on a web interface. The importance of an internal energy market at the EU 
level has grown over the years and special provisions as well as institutions were set up to 
control the progress towards a single energy union. For that a surveillance on the EU level 
has been done in the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
(hereinafter ACER) under the Regulation on Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and 
Transparency (hereinafter REMIT), which required all MS and their market participants to 
report and abide by the rules set up in REMIT (So young, 2017, p. 4). 
Europex (2017, p. 7) outlined that the characteristics of electricity and gas markets are 
similar to carbon trading. One of the first is the large profits that are generated in the gas 
and electricity sector, which makes fraudsters quickly attracted to take more risks than they 
would potentially do in comparison to other less profitable markets. Very similar 
characteristics to those in the carbon market are also applied in the gas and electricity 
markets, Guarantees of Origin (hereinafter GOs) should not be excluded. Fast trading via 
computer based systems, low shipping costs and the monitoring which is not centralised 
but spread across different areas in Europe are only some of the reasons presented by 
Europex (ibid.). While in some parts, the manipulation of other aspects of energy markets 
is monitored above national level as we can observe in the monitoring under the REMIT 
Regulation carried out by ACER, the VAT exploitation and its monitoring depends strictly on 
the national systems and no centralisation is in place.  
2.5.3 Guarantees of Origin system 
A Guarantee of Origin ‘indicates the generation of one megawatt hour (MWh) of electricity 
from an eligible source of renewable power’ (Kinect Energy Group, 2019).  
Guarantees of Origin is a system developed by the EU and first introduced by Renewable 
Electricity Directive of 20019, which obliged MS to develop a national scheme for GOs 
without specific instructions but instead ended up with only describing the purpose of the 
GOs. The purpose of GOs is to serve as a proof for generators of renewable electricity that 
they sell electricity produced from renewable sources. The more comprehensive approach 
                                                            
8 The Transmission System Operator is either a natural or legal person responsible for ensuring balanced and 
fully functional network, or in another way providing for a long-term maintenance (According to: Commission 
Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Commission Delegated Regulation 
supplementing Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to 
definitions, transparency, portfolio compression and supervisory measures on product intervention and 
positions {C(2016) 2860 final} {SWD(2016) 156 final}, 18.5.2016, SWD(2016) 157 final, p. 66). 
9 Directive 2001/77/CE.  
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was presented in Article 15 of the Renewable Energy Directive 2009/28/EC10. The purpose 
put forward by Centre for European Policy Studies is that the ‘GOs facilitate accurate 
disclosure of factual information on generation attributes associated with electricity 
delivered to final consumers’ (Jansen, Drabik & Egenhofer, 2016, p. 3–4). That purpose 
further expanded with the latest Directive 2009/28/EC and culminated in the development 
of more closely monitored system of tracking of GOs, including choices of energy 
consumers, harmonised approach and implementation of GOs across the EU, etc. A 
consistent approach was done through the Association of Issuing Bodies, which provides 
the most accurate oversight of national GOs tracking systems or European Energy 
Certificate System related to GOs market. In 2016, the GOs market was estimated to be 
300 million MWh and it keeps growing by approximately 12.5 % per year (Jansen, Drabik & 
Egenhofer, 2016, p. 2). That means that this is an expanding market in Europe, which could 
be subject to the same issues currently existing for emission allowances, gas and electricity 
markets. The fact is that the purchase of the GOs is performed on the voluntary market on 
renewable certificates and it is not connect to physical delivery. Despite voluntary 
purchases of GOs they are benefits which contribute to expanding of such market. That 
benefits also differ from the one related to utilities and power suppliers, which have 
obligations to disclose their energy source (in energy portfolio) to their consumers. The GOs 
system provides easy tracking of such energy sources as well as provides more green tariffs 
to consumers. In relation to companies, the GOs system is a tool that helps to achieve 
energy goals towards renewable energy targets (Kinect Enegy Group, 2019).  
In the common energy sector statement from September 2018, we can see a special 
chapter dedicated only to GOs. The treatment of GOs should be the same as for carbon 
allowances, especially since the nature of GOs is similar and bare same characteristics than 
the emission allowances. The risk of expanding VAT fraud onto another sector, in this case 
to GOs, is possible according to energy associations in Europe (Europex, 2018). 
2.5.4 Reasons for the spread of VAT fraud to the energy market 
Some of the reasons for VAT fraud in the EU were already mentioned in the beginning of 
this thesis and are common with other services and goods. This subchapter outlines specific 
reasons for each energy related commodity. As most of the VAT fraud was present in the 
field of carbon allowances those reasons are outlined first. 
                                                            
10 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of 
the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC 
and 2003/30/EC. Brussels, Belgium: European Council. 5 June 2009, retrieved 10 March 2019. 
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In 2017, Europex11 presented the main vulnerabilities or so-called characteristics of the 
carbon market that allowed for the spread of VAT fraud in emissions trading as well as for 
a huge damage of the market in 2009. The first issue put forward was the ease of setting 
up a registry account (Europex, 2017, p. 6). One of the highlights of the documentary 
‘Carbon Crooks’ which particularly exposes the Danish registry, is the registration of 
fraudsters without any checks, or ID information, therefore resulting in fake names and 
addresses. In many instances, these names were simply deceased literary figures. These 
resulted in a rapid increase of number of traders across Europe and the Danish registry 
quickly became one of the largest ones in the world. Most of the traders there were 
fraudsters, since it only took a minute to fill out an online form and trade the carbon credits 
(Carbon Crooks, 2013). Secondly, purchase of emission allowances overseas and quickly 
selling it to another country is seen as huge issue still today. If the first issue was resolved 
with Know Your Customer (hereinafter KYC) measures, the second issue could not be solved 
so quickly. That is also connected to the third characteristic outlined in presentation from 
Europex, which is no transport requirements or the need for storage. Carbon allowances 
were easier to trade with than any good with high value and small size, which are 
considered as more targeted goods. However, if it would not be for the easy and 
instantaneous cash settlement the wide spread of VAT in such a huge aspect would not be 
possible (Europex, 2017, p. 6). Consequently, the transactions of fraudsters were much 
quicker in comparison to the relevant tax authorities, the MTIC fraud spread over many 
networks within the EU and globally. The lack of control may be the beginning, but the 
performed fraudswere extremely quick and made it impossible to discover it in real time. 
Electricity and gas trading was next in line for the VAT fraud. The below reasons or 
characteristics highlight issues that would be important when later identified solutions to 
overcome VAT fraud are presented. Those solutions and are also connected to the 
described fraud cases in the third chapter.  
Reasons that contributed to the VAT fraud in electricity and gas markets are (Europex, 
2017, p. 7): 
- Connection with the emissions market, similar trading patters apply, same software 
and same market places can be used; 
- Implementation of the RCM in most of the EU countries for carbon allowances; 
- Liberalisation of the energy markets, which increased trading volumes across the 
EU; 
- Minimal technical requirements for trading electricity and gas; 
                                                            
11 ‘Europex is a not-for-profit association of European energy exchanges with currently 26 members. It 
represents the interests of exchange-based wholesale electricity, gas and environmental markets, focuses on 
developments of the European regulatory framework for wholesale energy trading and provides a discussion 
platform at European level.’, retrieved from: https://www.europex.org/about/mission/ 
16 
 
- Very low or even non transportation or shipping costs; 
- Very limited monitoring of the trading data; 
- Decisive place of supply, no cross-border movements of goods is necessary; 
- No recapitulative statements12 for the delivery of gas and electricity;  
- National energy authorities are not able to prevent or deny obtaining a shipper’s 
license to a suspicious company; and 
- Tax secrecy between energy and tax authorities that prevents sharing of relevant 
information with legitimate traders.  
It is important to note that the issues presented above are in some ways similar and also 
adding more reasons for the spread to VAT fraud to electricity and gas markets. Moreover, 
the above-mentioned reasons referring to the obtainment of shippers’ licenses, is 
described in underneath in the context of recently reported incidents. Those events clearly 
outline VAT fraud present on the EU energy markets and the events described later will 
elaborate more on the potential issues. Many of reasons presented are mentioned again 
the chapter 4 and 5, following with an explanation on the future solutions.   
                                                            
12A recapitulative statement is a periodical statement done by the suppliers who perform intra-community 
supply/acquisition of either goods or services that is mandatory for taxable persons. Recapitulative statement 
based on the intra-Community supply of goods and services is labelled ‘European Sales List’ and recapitulative 
statement based on the intra-Community acquisitions of goods is labelled ‘European Purchases List’, 
retrieved from: https://vatdesk.eu/en/vat-in-europe/.  
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3 MTIC FRAUD  
This section will explain terms that are of key importance for understanding of organised 
VAT fraud. It starts by providing some background on the development of MTIC and 
carousel fraud, continues with the definitions of both terms and identification of 
differences between MTIC and carousel as well as different types of MTIC chains that exists, 
and finally adds a connection with the energy markets.  
3.1 EVOLUTION OF MTIC  
The European Union Committee, which was appointed by the United Kingdom (hereinafter 
UK) House of Lords, the upper chamber of the UK's bicameral Parliament, produced one of 
the first detailed reports on the MTIC and Carousel fraud. On 25 May 2007, the Report 
‘Stopping the carousel: Missing trader fraud in the EU’, that analysed MTIC in the EU was 
published with an authorisation by the British House of Lords. The analysis produced in the 
report is based on the uprising issues with MTIC fraud that was recognised and realised as 
the potential danger in different sectors across the EU. The original proposal suggested a 
clearing house, which would stay on top of cross border trades among MS and ensure that 
tax collected in one MS would then be passed to the tax authorities in another MS. The 
original proposal was rejected and instead a zero-rated system inside the EU was accepted. 
That further meant that the exporter would not charge the VAT at first, but only claim it 
later and a purchaser will not pay the VAT, but instead remit VAT to the fiscal authorities. 
That kind of system is very susceptible to frauds and it remained unchanged despite many 
alarming situations across Europe. Already then, the outcome of the report highlighted that 
despite implementing an RCM over sectors that are identified as most susceptible, fraud 
would mutate and spread to another sector not implementing the RCM (House of Lords, 
2007, p. 10). It is also worth mentioning that the UK is identified as one of the ‘biggest 
victims’ of VAT fraud inside the EU and therefore the most analysis and reports can be 
made in that respect. Next, it is important to understand that fraud took place due to many 
trading houses registered and operating in the UK market as well as a higher VAT rate in 
the UK compared to other EU MS (Eurojust, 2014, p. 2). As seen in the chapter four, one of 
the most publicly known cases started in the UK involving individual traders and eventually 
spreading to several international banks.  
The MTIC fraud in its most simple form is when a trader collects the tax and simply does 
not remit it to the government, that type of fraud is known as acquisition fraud. An 
acquisition fraud is commodity based and it solely based on the VAT purchases that are 
zero-rated between two MS in the EU, where it can be seen that even more aggressive 
forms of fraud are present. The following four factors introduce the reasons for the growth 
of VAT fraud that originates in the EU (House of Lords, 2007, p. 10):  
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- The goods that have high value as well as low weight are easier to transport;  
- Zero rate taxation between MS inside the EU;  
- Exporters of goods are able to reclaim VAT at the same time than revenue 
authority refunds a payment for which it did not receive a remittance; and 
- Abolition of internal borders, which creates a problem with verification.  
The first and second factors are related the nature of the phenomenon which is called 
carousel VAT fraud, which means that the goods are traded repeatedly, between shell 
companies that are set up for this specific purpose. That is the reason why EU zero-rated 
transactions are so vulnerable for this type of fraud, which was lower in other countries 
(ibid.). In general, the above four factors gave background for the existence of VAT fraud 
that included a missing trader specifically. It is important to outline the reasons which were 
present already in 2007 in order to identify if any of those reasons were addressed properly 
in the meantime. Europex (2017, p. 5) mentioned similar issues for the electricity and gas 
trading market and the additional liberalisation and dis-integration of the electricity and 
gas sector. On top of the abolishment of internal borders within the single European 
market, both sectors changed their characteristics even further with trading volumes 
constantly increasing, thus allowing the presence of fraudsters’ on the market. The 
relatively new energy market means new rules needed to be established as well as more 
control over energy market, which is still evolving. There is no general control or monitoring 
in place to provide an overview of transactions for energy market related to VAT fraud, 
since national tax authorities are not sharing such information between each other. As we 
can see, Europex (2017) identifies those issues as basis for the establishment of VAT fraud 
and adds more specific characteristics of the energy market which contribute to expanding 
of the VAT fraud further. Fraud on energy markets was only defined in recent years after 
the first publicly known cases appeared. That means that many recognised issues persist in 
the market as no legislative changes were proposed or implemented. The fraud on the 
energy market can take place in many ways still as no legislative or other changes were 
implemented.  
3.2 MTIC FRAUD 
The MTIC fraud is described including two main elements, a missing trader and an intra-
community supply as well as two types, an acquisition and carousel fraud. The latter is a 
more developed form of MTIC or a systematic fraud involving a defaulting trader. The 
different types of frauds would be presented below, based on the missing trader figure as 
a key illegal figure of all transactions, or chains. In order to understand the figures showing 
chain transactions the basic terms below are explained together with schemas outlining 
transactions of trades in detail below.  
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3.2.1 Missing trader  
The so-called missing trader is not the first one in the chain of fraudulent transactions and 
already its name is self-explanatory. Missing trader means the company that disappears 
before paying the VAT back to its tax/fiscal authorities. According to Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 1925/2004 (Article 2) (1), missing trader is a trader that acquires goods 
or services with the intention to manipulate the market without remitting the VAT back to 
the authorities. Alternatively, as the second part of the definition states, the missing trader 
operates with a purpose to: ‘to hijack a VAT registration’ that results in using another VAT 
registration number. With respect to the MTIC fraud, we can differentiate between 
acquisition and carousel fraud.  (Commission Regulation (EC) No 1925/2004, Article 2 (2)). 
While performing MTIC fraud, the difference between energy and other commodities is 
that energy can physically stay in one country, which means no physical delivery takes 
place, but the fraud still occurs. When energy is traded, the VAT rules apply and that 
happens via contracts for delivery that only indicate that the delivery will happen in the 
future. It is for those reasons and characteristics that energy trading is more susceptible to 
fraud. Moreover, energy can be traded without recapitulative statements and thus makes 
it harder for performing later data analysis (So young, 2017, p. 5). 
3.2.2 Acquisition fraud 
The below figure illustrates the easiest fraud strategy, called the acquisition fraud. This type 
of fraud follows simple transaction whereas the company (classified below as Company B) 
acquire goods from another MS inside the EU, VAT free and resells them in the retail 
market, in the MS where it is based charging VAT. Then simply disappears and in some 
cases can also use the hijacked VAT number.  
Figure 3: Acquisition fraud 
 
Source: Anderson H. & Franzen K. VAT (2008, p. 23) 
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3.2.3 Carousel fraud 
The carousel fraud involves a missing trader, which typically buys goods intracommunity 
VAT free and then sells it to another company charging the VAT. After illegally earning the 
VAT that it did not remit to the authorities, it goes missing and hence forms the name of 
missing trader fraud. In the intracommunity business-to-business transactions, the form of 
carousel fraud often follow flow schemas as described in the below text and outlined in the 
Figure 4 (House of Lords, 2007, p. 8):  
Company A, also called a conduit company is registered and operates in a MS 1. The goods 
from the Company A are transferred to Company B with issuing an invoice, which is VAT 
exempted.  
Company B or so-called missing trader company is registered in a MS 2. The company B 
then sells goods to Company C (located in the MS 2) and charges the VAT on the invoice 
that was issued to Company C. Company B collects the VAT but does not remit it to the tax 
authorities and finally disappears/goes missing.  
Company C (in this case an intermediary/buffer company) is used to distort the 
investigation of VAT fraud. The goods received from Company B with VAT are sold to 
Company D, again charging the VAT. It is important to note that the company might be 
completely unaware of any fraud. Nevertheless Company D should be on alert if it receives 
an offer below priced well below market level or if unusually high access fees are being 
paid. 
Company D or broker pays VAT on purchase and makes an intracommunity supply to 
Company A in MS 1. 
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Figure 4: Generalised carousel fraud 
 
Source: House of Lords (2007, p. 9) 
3.2.4 Difference between MTIC and carousel fraud  
Figure 4 above could explain both the MTIC as well as the carousel fraud. The difference 
between MTIC and carousel is that the latter is more complex, as shown above. The goods 
in the carousel fraud make their way back to the original seller, completing the loop in the 
carousel. The MTIC is the broader term, which includes many different ways of transactions 
but in principle both frauds are including a missing trader (Podlipnik, 2012, p. 5).  
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The above Figure 4 was chosen as is one of the most general options but it is important to 
acknowledge that there are many other possible chains of MTIC fraud. According to EC 
document on MTIC Fraud Gap estimation methodologies the many types of MTIC fraud 
explain different chains that could be performed. In comparison with MTIC, the carousel 
fraud schemes offer a higher volume to be traded in a smaller amount of time. Damages 
may amount to millions only in a matter of days that is why carousel fraud include higher 
risk than MTIC or other types of MTIC described below (European Commission, 2018b, p. 
10). 
3.3 OTHER TYPES OF MTIC FRAUD 
3.3.1 Cross-invoicer 
Other important, but similar types of MTIC fraud include the ‘Cross-invoicer’. In this 
transaction chain, the missing trader does not disappear immediately but instead uses a 
fictitious invoice, which is based on the false supply of goods. With this false invoice, the 
missing trader deducts VAT that should be payed to the authorities. The domestic supply is 
therefore based on the fictitious invoice as well as goods delivered from a hijacked 
company. That strategy of missing trader could be applied when further sales as well as 
VAT payments are made (European Commission, 2018b, p. 12).  
3.3.2 Contra trading 
One of the most complicated chains that further develops on the previously explained 
transactions such as acquisition fraud is the ‘Contra-trading’ scheme. The scheme operates 
in a way that half of the transactions are legal with the purpose of covering the other half 
of transactions that are illegal. As a result, the MS suffer from double losses, one due to the 
disappearing missing trader and other due to the VAT refunds by the company. Another 
example, based on the real case from Romania and Bulgaria will be shown in the fourth 
chapter. Despite different schemes employed by fraudsters, the end result for two chains 
is similar. The below Figure 5 shows that the transactions that are in detail described in the 
following three steps (European Commission, 2018b, p. 13): 
1. In the contra-trading scheme, everything starts with the two acquisitions from 
Company C (located in the MS 2) or so-called contra trader. First, the Company C 
performs a domestic purchase of goods from another company, which is actually 
the missing trader. The missing trader acquired those goods from Company A 
(located in the MS 1) on the intracommunity purchase, therefore without VAT. 
Second, the Company C acquires goods from Company D (located in the MS 1); 
2. The missing trader than disappears and as always does not remit VAT to the 
authorities; 
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3. Then Company C again makes two transactions, this time in form of the supply. First 
transaction is an intra-community supply to the Company G (located in the MS 3). 
Second is a domestic supply to Company E, which is not related to the chain 
involving fraud. Company E will then make a supply to Company F (located in the 
MS 3) that is VAT free. 
Figure 5: Contra-trading scheme 
 
Source: European Commission (2018b, p. 13) 
3.3.3 Triangular transactions 
The triangular transactions are connected and based on the carousel scheme because they 
involve many transactions, as it is also common for carousel fraud. The main point of 
triangular transactions is that that there is a direct transaction of goods from one MS to 
another MS but more invoices, or so called ‘VAT deliveries’ are issued. Such transactions 
can also take place in only one MS, but it is more common that more MS are involved since 
a lot of transactions are required to cover the tracks. As a first step, an intra community 
delivery from the first company in one MS to second company based in another MS is 
performed. The second step works as a continuation of that delivery, where the second 
company sells good to a third company, based in a different MS. Physical delivery takes 
place from the first to the third MS. Those transactions describe two issued invoices but 
only one physical flow. The fraud takes place due to the simplified regime by missing trader 
in the third MS, where also losses occur (ibid).  
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4 MISSING TRADER FRAUD CASES  
This chapter aims to present the most relevant VAT fraud cases that were committed using 
missing trader or carousel schemes in the EU energy market. The first part analyses in detail 
the flow and progress of three different cases in the emissions market. For the purpose of 
defining the degree of intent of the involved participants in those three cases, the following 
differentiation between push and pull type is outlined, as described by Ainsworth (2016a, 
p. 3). The push-type MT fraud is committed when the carbon allowances were pushed or 
came to the bank unaware of being part of the fraud chain. The pull-type MTIC fraud is the 
opposite and refers to the employees pulling the carbon allowances into the bank to 
acquire bonuses and conspiring to commit criminal offences. Those definitions are 
especially relevant for the first subchapter. In the second part of this chapter, the biggest 
crimes relevant for the carbon market and its spread to the field of money laundering is 
outlined. In the last two parts, the electricity and gas VAT fraud as well as GOs are 
presented. Even with limited information on those commodities, Eurojust (2014, p. 3, 4) 
presented in numbers how the growth of MTIC cases is seen. In 2009, only 23 cases were 
registered in comparison to 89 cases registered in 2013. The increasing numbers show 
growth of MTIC fraud in the EU. Even with limited information on energy market, the recent 
cases that emerged in 2019 show interesting developments and an ongoing presence of 
VAT fraud in all four analysed energy commodities that are relevant for this thesis.  
4.1 VAT FRAUD MUTATION IN THREE PARTS 
A well conducted research was made by professor, Richard T. Ainsworth at Boston 
University, which is specialised in the EU carbon markets as well as discovering flaws in the 
EU-ETS. Therefore, the below cases represents a so-called ‘continuum’. The chosen cases, 
Dosanjh, Citigroup Global Marketing Limited (hereinafter Citibank) and Deutsche Bank, 
highlight a transition from individual based criminal offences to institutional commerce, in 
other words from the push-type to the pull-type of MTIC fraud (Ainsworth, February 2016a, 
p. 4). These cases are interesting because they are revealing VAT fraud committed by big 
entities around the world, such as Deutsche Bank. The lack of control by relevant 
authorities, which responded too late on the emerging frauds are explained later on during 
the analysis of outlined cases. Precisely because of slow reaction of the authorities, an 
interesting research on how companies and banks are functioning within the new EU-ETS 
market was made. In this subsection, the evolvement of fraud ‘mutation’ in three parts 
describes these loopholes discovered by fraudsters and highlights the main threats.  
In the below Figure 6, the timeline of the three chosen VAT fraud cases is shown for better 
representation of the events as well as its correlation with the BlueNext collapse, which is 
described in the subsection 4.2. The timeline shows that most of the VAT fraud related to 
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carbon allowances happened during 2009. Sandeep Dosanjh as many other traders on the 
French exchange were starting to trade already in 2008 and over few months the 
authorities finally stepped in and started to pay attention to the change of behaviour on 
the emissions market. In mid-2009, many regulatory changes happened in the bigger MS 
such as France, UK and Netherlands. The fraud connection with Deutsche Bank was 
discovered towards the end of 2009. The timeline shows that despite many months of no 
reaction by authorities, the discovery of such big fraud still encouraged fast reactions in the 
field of law and enforcement.  
Figure 6: Time-line of CO2 MTIC fraud cases, law changes and BlueNext collapse 
 
 
Source: Ainsworth (2016a, p. 7) 
4.1.1 Dosanjh case 
This case served as a precedent and it was the first known CO2 MTIC case with a conviction. 
The fraud occurred on January 20, 2009 throughout May 6, 2009. Sandeep Singh Dosanjh, 
also called the mastermind behind the MTIC carbon fraud stole more than EUR 41 million 
from the UK Exchequer in 69 days. The trades of carbon allowances offered below the 
market price were made in minutes into the investment banks and other energy 
companies. The stolen VAT trace was seen in banks in New Zealand, Australia, Hong Kong, 
Dubai and other offshore accounts. This case represents the classic push-type in the MTIC 
fraud (Ainsworth, 2016a, p. 4). At the beginning, fraudsters started with the KO Brokers 
company, originally providing consultancy services, which until 2009 had a little business 
activity. After January 2009, KO Brokers started their business with VAT frauds, and 
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Dosanjh, as the mastermind behind the fraud set up two parallel CO2 MTIC chains. Both 
chains were composed from three entities and both were operating in prescribed linear 
manner, no cross-chain sales or sales outside chains happened. The first chain (Swift-to-
Allianz-to-AGH-to-KO Brokers) was operating from 20 January to 8 April 2009, and second 
(Mak-to-Helio-to-Infiniti-to-KO Brokers) from 2 April to 6 May 2009. Both chains fed into 
KO Brokers, where all transactions were planned and controlled by Dosanjh. Once the 
carbon allowances were possessed by KO Brokers, they were sold to a ‘blue chip’ company 
outside of the UK, acting as a distributor in MTIC fraud or the company sold permits to a 
‘blue chip’ company inside the UK, functioning as ‘final buffer’. Among the most known 
international ‘blue chip’ companies trading with KO Brokers, were Gazprom Marketing, 
Trading Powernext, Climatefx SA, Morgan Stanley Capital Group inc, etc. In the UK, the 
‘blue chip’ companies were Shell Trading International Ltd., BP Gas Marketing Limited, 
Citigroup Global Markets Ltd., Royal Bank of Scotland plc, BNP Paribas, and Deutsche Bank 
AG. All the mentioned companies are shown in squares in the below figure 7. The real 
money laundering started with payment platforms that were set up specifically for each 
chain. The first chain via AGH Company used Trade Alliance Financial Group in the Standard 
Chartered Bank of Hong Kong as their payment platform. The Hong Kong authorities closed 
Dosanjh`s account on the 9 April due to suspicion of payment via AGH chain. That meant 
the end of trading trough that specific chain. However, Dosanjh replaced the Hong Kong 
account in 6 days, setting up an Australian payment platform Technocash, with an account 
held by a Swedish entity. The final destination for the funds was the Dubai based company, 
Astra Trading FEZ, which received EUR 162.5 million from KO Brokers’ trades. The second 
chain used Ultimate Financial Services as a payment platform with an account from New 
Zealand`s national bank ANZ. After the multiple payments, the final destination of funds 
was again with the company, Astra Trading FEZ based in Dubai (Ainsworth, 2016a, p. 10–
12).   
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Figure 7: Financial flows of Dosanjhs` transactions 
 
Source: Ainsworth (2016, p. 10) 
What is even more interesting are the sales connected to Deutsche Bank, which bought 
27,000 carbon allowances from KO Brokers on 6 May 2009 for EUR 461,700 including VAT, 
which was remitted to the account in the ANZ bank of New Zealand. The payment was then 
used to pay KO Brokers debt to Infiniti, further Infiniti paid its debt to Helio, and Helio to 
Mak, which was the missing trader. After that, the funds were transferred to Astra Trading 
FEZ. That was the last transaction investigated by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
(hereinafter HMRC) against Dosanjh. The companies AGH and Infiniti were de-registered 
on May 7 2009 and KO Brokers stopped its purchases of carbon allowances from UK 
supplies. Nevertheless, the other purchases continued, and Deutsche Bank bought even 
higher amounts of allowances, the reasons why, together with the detailed analysis are 
provided in the third subchapter of this section (Ainsworth, 2016a, p. 13). 
The mastermind Dosanjh was arrested on 19 August 2009, together with others six persons 
involved in the fraud (Ainsworth, 2016a, p. 15). The court discovered that despite the fraud 
executed by Dosanjh and his collaborators, the ‘blue chip’ companies that were involved in 
transactions should have paid more attention by following the KYC procedure. According 
to the court, that represented a massive failure on the side of these well-known companies. 
Another finding by HMRC highlighted that such frauds could quickly move to other 
commodities in the energy sector and raised an alarm among European energy 
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associations. In 2012, a journalist Michael Szabo (Reuters, 2012) wrote an article with the 
title: ‘UK CO2 fraudsters trade Rolls Royce’s for jail time’ that implies a huge fraud on the 
market was discovered, but also emphasises how late the public received the information. 
Fraudsters were already released from jail by that time, according to Ainsworth (2016a, p. 
14, 15) seven out of ten that were imprisoned were also released the following year, August 
2010. The fraudsters’ luxurious lifestyle was noticed among other traders, who reported 
their observation after the discovery of fraud. The news of the case begun to leak into the 
public domain and more articles regarding the investigations were published. Perhaps the 
most interesting was the point where customs officials recognised a loophole and potential 
loss of GBP 2 billion but could not act without an attorney general, which was at the time 
not present in the office. There was an urgent need to secure the loss of more revenues 
and the relevant authorities had to authorise law changes to zero-rate VAT. This change 
happened in only 48 hours and UK enacted the zero-rated VAT system on 1 August 2009. 
The change to zero-rate trades had a direct link to the Dosanjh case and his fraudulent 
chains, which could be stopped afterwards. The trades with carbon allowances than 
dropped by 90 percent (Connett, 2012). The main facts about the case are the following: 1) 
Dosanjh and his collaborators stole around EUR 41 million through MTIC fraud in a six 
month period from January to June 2009; and 2) The HRMC changed its law to zero-rate 
VAT in order to prevent carbon credit VAT fraud, as a direct result of Dosanjh investigation.  
In the press release by City of London Police (2018), a sentence given to Dosanjh and two 
of senior brokers of his company was reported. The report on Dosanjh’s actions is related 
to the VAT fraud performed at a later stage than the one described above. His conviction 
was made on the actions taken from January 2012 to August 2013. Dosanjh sold carbon 
allowances through two companies, which resulted him being sentenced to four years and 
six months on 18 September 2018. The profits were extremely high taking advantage of 
selling emission allowances to more than 130 victims that paid an excessive price per 
allowance. That results in the fact that Dosanjh is finally serving his sentence in prison 
together with three other collaborators.  
4.1.2 Citibank case 
Ainsworth (2016b, p. 2) suggests that this case is a transitional case, necessary for 
understanding how push-type MTIC fraud transformed into a pull-type MTIC fraud. The US 
investment bank Citibank was registered on three carbon registers, in UK, France and 
Germany. In each of these markets, the company had its own registry account with the 
name Citigroup Global Markets Limited – CGML. Citibank's main period of activity was in 
the month of July 2009. The UK registry bought 7,580,001 CO2 permits, and more than 70 
percent of these permits was sold abroad but still intra-community. The transfers from UK 
to French registry occurred in seven bundles and were then quickly sold on the French 
exchange, BlueNext. The highest amount of permits sold to BlueNext in one bundle was 
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3,840,000. BNP Paribas, a leading French investment bank, received a smaller batch of 
2,250,000 AAUs and even smaller amount of 65,000 AAUs, was sold to Danish company 
STX services. Those three transactions where later on acknowledged as the most critical 
ones. Citibank zero-rated all three sales and took the full deduction for the VAT paid in UK. 
The separate bundles of transactions were enormous and are outlined in the figure 8 
below. 
Figure 8: Citibank purchases and its indirect transfers to BlueNext 
 
Source: Ainsworth (2016b, p. 5) 
The interesting fact is that these transactions alone would probably not raise a suspicion of 
HMRC to perform investigations. One of the potential reasons why Citibank was 
investigated could be its connection with KO Brokers and the purchase of 1,853,000 permits 
that Citibank made during Dosanjhs` 69 days of fraud. That was the reasons HMRC already 
closely look at the banks’ transactions. Second reason for discovering Citibank's fraud were 
the price spikes between month of June and July 2009. At that time, Dutch and French 
authorities already took action to prevent MTIC frauds from happening, but the VAT was 
not yet zero-rated in the UK. When this finally happened Citibank `s activity in the CO2 
market trading fell immediately. This suggested a connection to an artificial market. Thirdly, 
Citibank was the second largest purchaser of CO2 permits from SVS Securities PLC that 
bought all the permits from the mentioned company. First largest buyer was the Deutsche 
bank. The fact that investigation reached so quickly to Citibank as well as Deutsche Bank 
could show that SVS Securities PLC were following Dosanjh's steps or that HMRC followed 
the path of the major fraud they discovered (Ainsworth, 2016b, p. 6).  
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In the case of Citibank, it is not clear if the case is a push- or a pull-type of MTIC fraud. 
According the Ainsworth (2016b, p. 2) it could be both and that is why such case is 
considered as a transition to the last of the three VAT mutation cases described in this 
subchapter. Moreover, the judge in the case Citibank NA v. HM Revenue & Customs ruled 
that at least one employee of Citibank had knowledge of the ongoing frauds, but it cannot 
be certain who and how many of individuals were actually connected to fraud. Despite not 
identifying the individuals, it was recognised that the Citibank as an entity had constructive 
knowledge of the ongoing fraud. That means that in general the fraud was recognised but 
more evidence needed to be presented in the case against KO Brokers in order to show 
connection to the Citibank (First-tier Tribunal Tax Chamber, 2014).  
4.1.3 Deutsche Bank case 
One of the most significant indictments in relation to carbon emissions permits is Deutsche 
Bank`s involvement in CO2 fraud. The fact is that Dosanjh sold to both finance houses, 
Citibank and the Deutsche Bank. Next, the UK VAT rate changed and so did Deutsche Bank’s 
trading patterns. From its originally UK based permits flowing to Germany, the permits 
were in the Deutsche Bank's case sent into the UK from Germany. That meant that the 
fraud moved to Germany. Two important elements were part of this fraud's mutation to 
the push-type MTIC. First, in Germany there was no company or person that would provide 
Deutsche Bank with large volumes of under-priced CO2, and secondly, the realisation of 
the Deutsche Bank CO2 trading desk that it does not need such suppliers, instead they 
alone controlled the CO2 market. That was done with setting up a firm, which every 
morning sold to specific customers below the market price. Those elements represented 
an evolution in MTIC fraud. The employees of Deutsche Bank, aware of the MTIC fraud 
deliberately pulled the fraudulent permits into to the bank (Ainsworth, 2016c, p. 2). The 
following Figure 9 shows a visual representation of transactions. The purchases made via 
SVS Securities, imply there were transactions involving a missing trader. As in other cases 
presented, it is important to realise who the missing trader is, despite the fact that either 
a buffer or conduit company could perform VAT fraud.  
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Figure 9: Purchases of Deutsche Bank and Citibank from SVS Securities 
 
Source: Ainsworth (2016c, p. 14) 
After the change of law in the UK, Deutsche Bank started with a new strategy. Mr Roderick 
G. Stone, the HMRC's National MTIC Coordinator was following the leads of Dosanjh and 
Citibank case. He made a personal visit on 18 November and 17 December 2009 in order 
to go further with his investigation. Mr Stone`s work was essential in identification of the 
fraudulent chains and served as a basis for the Frankfurt chief prosecutor`s case against 
Deutsche Bank. Mr Stone was looking into reasons why the Deutsche Bank went from being 
net VAT payer to refund claimant (Ainsworth, 2016c, p. 3–5).  
The first large refund claim made by Deutsche Bank was on 30 June 2009, in the amount of 
GBP 15,142,906 and second in the amount of GBP 48,142,906 on 30 September 2009. Only 
the first one was honoured. Mr Stone's investigation was the reason why the second claim 
was not processed. Upon his first visit (18 November 2009) Mr Stone made clear to traders 
they are under investigation and specifically mentioned the connection of his 
administrative investigation with Dosanjh and KO Brokers. However, not even the first nor 
the second visit changed the trading activities on the UK or German market, on the 
contrary, the trading was accelerated. The UK was also saved by its change of law, the 
implementation of zero-rate system which ensured MTIC was no longer possible. Mr Stone 
believed that fraud can still occur in other EU countries and continued with his 
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administrative investigation where he tried to establish trading chains and ascertain 
culpability. Eventually, Frankfurt’s Chief Prosecutor took action and raided Deutsche Bank 
offices in Frankfurt on 28 April 2010. More than 230 offices and homes were raided, based 
on 150 suspects working across 50 companies (Ainsworth, 2010, p. 4–6). Since the case had 
such a huge dimension, it was not surprising that it made headlines in the news. Spiegel 
(2012) even reported on the involvement of the Deutsche Bank's CEO in the MTIC fraud, 
since the CEO was the one signing the 2009 VAT statement. The dawn raid performed in 
2010 arrested the main persons involved in the VAT fraud and ensured that the CO2 trading 
stopped. Frunza (2019, p. 213) reports on the conviction of six Deutsche Bank employees 
in 2016. The court criticized  Deutsche Bank in the sense that there was a failure in its 
compliance system that allowed the fraud to happen. Out of the convicted persons, the 
sentence of three years was the highest.  This was given to the regional sales manager. In 
total, the convicted employees defrauded MS of EUR 145 million in unpaid VAT.   
In 2017, the British newspaper The Daily Telegraph published another carbon fraud related 
news story. The name of the British businessman otherwise called ‘batman’ was revealed 
to the public. Peter Singh Virdee was operating in the background of the 2009 carbon frauds 
in the UK that spread to German market and he was wanted in Germany as responsible for 
operating with many different fraudulent chains (Rothwell & Huggler, 2017). In the recent 
publication by Spiegel (2019) another high-ranking employee of Deutsche Bank is accused 
of VAT fraud related to carbon allowances. The attorney general in Frankfurt filed charges 
against a person who was allegedly trading with fraudulent allowances in 2009. The 
employee, who was an Austrian national was working in London and was at the time of the 
fraud in charge of the division on emission sales. The defendant is now waiting for the court 
decision, which could result in up to 10 years' imprisonment. The 2010 raid revealed other 
companies such as ‘Solutions’, ‘Vector’, and ‘Red Star’ being part of illegal chains.  
The above examples show the issues of long investigations related to VAT fraud, especially 
in case of intangible commodities, which can last for many years. Another issue observed 
are the obstacles between countries that prevent authorities from proceeding with 
investigations, hence, cooperation should be improved in order to react quicker. Of course, 
the above examples also highlight difficulties with finding relevant evidence that would 
ensure strong background for case proceedings. That is again something which could be 
connected with more alignment across authorities of several MS affected.  
33 
 
4.2 CRIMES IN THE FIELD OF EU-ETS 
4.2.1 Collapse of the carbon emissions exchange market  
4.2.1.1 Relevant facts  
The incident defined as the crime of the century, which in modern times caused most 
damage to the financial and energy markets, happened largely from 2008 to 2009 on the 
Paris BlueNext power exchange platform. Even today, the so-called Bluenext fraud is still 
focus of much analysis and research, as well as movies and documentaries. On 2 May 2016, 
a trial of twelve persons accused of involvement in the Bluenext fraud opened at the Paris 
Criminal Tribunal. The trial was connected to the biggest heist that defrauded the EU of 
EUR 5 billion and France alone of EUR 1.6 billion within a two-year window. The fraud 
scheme used by fraudsters took on great dimensions of carousel fraud and was associated 
with offshore accounts and money laundering. Out of three masterminds behind the fraud, 
two of them were present at the trial; the third was murdered in 2010. Another six persons 
fled to Israel. Despite the trial and identification of involved persons, the money was never 
found. The fraudsters used various shell companies and wired money through international 
chains between Cyprus, Latvia and Hong Kong. The most recognisable step was a bank in 
China through which the money was laundered (Mazoue, 2016). The described events 
inspired a movie that was released a year after the trial took place, called ‘Carbone’. But 
even more relevant was a documentary released in 2013 ‘Carbon Crooks’, which brought 
forward opinions and views from the former EU commissioners, policy officers and traders 
that were active on the market during the time of carbon fraud. The trader interviewed in 
the documentary talks about stolen credits from the Czech carbon registry (described in 
next subchapter) where it was possible to ‘legally’ earn EUR 50,000 in 5 minutes. The 
documentary shows a huge problem that started already when Danish registry allowed 
anyone to become part of trading chains, and concludes that in more than 90 percent, the 
accounts in the registry used fake names of dead poets and other non-existing addresses. 
In the carbon fraud, many traders used a very simple form of missing trader scheme to a 
more complicated carousel fraud. The fraudsters who stole the highest amounts during the 
2008 and 2009 needed a huge amount of initial investments and previous knowledge to 
perform such a high-level fraud and continue with fraudulent transaction over many 
months. Today, it is known that those masterminds were connected to criminal 
organisations in the Middle East, Israel and countries of the former Soviet Union. The chain 
of fraudsters and their accomplices expanded over time as also demonstrated in the movie 
and the documentary mentioned above (Heinemann, 2014).   
The exact carousel scheme used in the Bluenext exchange is outlined in the figure 10 below. 
It works on a basis of simple missing trader scheme but quickly transforms to carousel 
fraud, performing various transactions on the market. In Figure 10, the chain of 
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transactions shows how the trader dealt with the VAT of one simple allowance. The key 
strategy was that the VAT was transferred to the offshore bank account, instead of being 
remitted to the tax authorities in the last step and then the trader closed its business, 
leaving no trace behind. Additionally, a big part of scheme strategy was exporting carbon 
allowances from companies in another EU MS, and then selling them on the Bluenext 
exchange VAT free. The transactions of carbon allowances were flowing in two directions 
and both were fraudulent with a main goal to never issue any VAT return to the authorities. 
The traders started small but continued and expanded its chains as well as volumes traded, 
using Bluenext as a main trading platform (Frunza, 2010, p. 5). 
Figure 10: Carousel fraud scheme on the Bluenext exchange 
 
Source: Frunza (2010, p. 5) 
The latest news from 2018 (Boyer King) report on the 36 people involved in the VAT fraud was sent 
to trial. Their actions were not different from any other traders during 2009 VAT fraud on carbon 
market. The difference is that many of involved were caught and even admit their actions explain 
that CO2 scan did not represent a lot of work when stealing of VAT took place. The accused 
fraudsters performed their frauds very quickly once they spread their network, which was very wide 
and included people from various fields. With four assassinations police started to discover huge 
network of fraudsters that were fledging to Israel. The countries exchanged information and police 
started to made arrests and discovering network of involved individuals. Despite those discoveries 
many of collaborators were not discovered as well as not all the money was recovered.  
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4.2.1.2 From volume changes to price movements 
One of the most interesting ways to show the effects of the carbon trading on the EU 
markets can be done with analysing the price changes during the period from 2008 to 2010. 
Although price movements or price spikes are not the only indicator of an abnormal state 
on the market, it is all connected to changes in the volume traded on the market, as it 
happened in the case of VAT fraud in 2009. Frunza (2010, p. 7) analysed price and volumes 
with the help of a statistical methodology, showing a clear distortion on the market starting 
already in 2008 and continuing for the most of 2009. The below Figure 11 shows carbon 
allowances exchanged between June 2008 and February 2010, dividing the analysis in three 
periods: ante VAT fraud – Period 1; VAT fraud – Period 2; post VAT fraud – Period 3.  
Figure 11: Carbon allowances volumes on Bluenext exchange 
 
Source: Frunza (2010, p. 7) 
As per results in the Figure 11 above, the Bluenext exchange had more than 19 million tons 
of EUAs on 2 June 2009, raising from 15 million tons on 28 May 2009. After the 
announcement and implementation of the reverse charge implementation, the volumes 
fell almost to zero, and then kept their position at 2.5 million EUAs trades per day. In order 
to have a good comparison it is important to highlight that on average around 7 million 
EUAs were traded per day during the first four months of 2009 (Frunza, 2010, p. 5). 
Price movements identified by Frunza (2010, p. 7) show the same distortions as in the figure 
12. The price in the period 2 – VAT fraud, fell to very low levels and the historically low price 
was identified in February 2009 at the amount of EUR 7 for one carbon allowance. Similar 
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then in Figure 11, the prices of carbon allowances price started to drop towards the end of 
2008, which continued throughout 2009, during the VAT fraud.  
Figure 12: Carbon allowances prices from February 2008 to January 2010 
 
Source: Frunza (2010, p. 7) 
Frunza (ibid.) tries to explain and present analytical facts why the VAT fraud on the carbon 
market was not discovered for almost two full years. One of the first reasons is the nature 
of the carbon allowances that had a double status, as a financial instrument and as a basic 
commodity, which meant that financial regulators focused less on its control. Second, many 
differences across MS related to the implementation of RCM were present. Those 
differences still exist today and are visualised for each commodity separately, in chapter 
focusing on RCM. Third, in 2009 a global financial crisis took place and regulators had to 
deal with number of issues at that time. The control of energy market trading with VAT 
returns was anything else but a priority. The statistical analysis and tools made by Frunza 
(2010, p. 15) all show huge breaches and market manipulation. Such tools could be used 
for future analysis, especially for  similar commodities such as for gas and power markets. 
In his book dedicated to VAT fraud, Frunza (2019) highlights the most recent issues that 
exist in today’s European markets. Several parts, including the interviews at the end of the 
book focused on the carbon scam in the previous decade and tried to explain the 
background of the crimes. Frunza (2019, p. 94–95) replies to question of why the recovery 
of lost VAT is so difficult despite recognizing potential individuals and entities involved in 
fraud. First, the time gap between fraud being committed and investigation being 
performed is extremely long. The same happened in the case of Bluenext fraud, which took 
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roughly 6 years to bring fraudsters in front of court. It is obvious that fraudsters needed far 
less time to move illegally earned money via offshore accounts and through few 
jurisdictions. Another way of hiding the money is spending it on luxury products and 
services, with the purpose of limiting tax enforcement operations to seize it. Today 
fraudsters are also using crypto technology for value storage. Next, there is a general 
limitation for tax authorities when trying to seize the money earned by fraudsters. There 
are difficulties already present inside one country, but even more when fraud occurs cross 
border. Last, the tax authorities face many bureaucratic procedures and processes that 
differ between countries. For the purposes of cross border issues within the EU, the 
EUROFISC was created. Although it brings certain control in the EU, it is helpless when 
fraudsters include offshore locations to hide their assets. The connection with money 
laundering is obvious, especially with high amounts that require fraudsters to use modern 
methods of hiding high amounts that were illegally earned.  
4.2.1.3 The Carbon connection 
In addition to the above facts and price movement analysis related to the Bluenext 
exchange, there were many more operations conducted that identified fraud in 2009. The 
fact is that the Bluenext platform still allowed for the highest losses of EUR 1.9 billion to 
occur, in comparison with the total amount of EUR 10 billion that was defrauded in 2009 
from all fraudulent chains. All those operations, joined under the name ‘Carbon 
Connection’ had a common factor, all started with opening an account via the Danish 
registry. That was an easy procedure without any background checks, also mentioned at 
the Carbon Crooks documentary where examples of fake names and locations are shown. 
Frunza (2019, p. 202) elaborated further on the national and European investigations which 
were named as follows: ‘Operation Tulipbox, Mirage in the UK; Operation Crepuscule in 
France; Operation Dreyfus in Denmark; Operation Vertigo, carried out by the Europol; 
Operation B2 Euro in Belgium; Operation Blue Sky in Spain; Operation Green Plus AG Energy 
in Norway; Operation Hardware in the Netherlands; and Operation Odin in Germany.’. The 
first operation in the UK involved already described cases of Dosanjh and his company KO 
Brokers, as well as Citibank. Operation Crepuscule is actually the name of the company 
trading at the Bluenext power exchange. Crepscule traded around 12 million EUAs and was 
one of the biggest players right after the Deutsche Bank. The value of the EUAs traded was 
around EUR 826 million and linked with many other companies, such as Coer2 Commodities 
(Frunza, 2019, p. 203). Next, the Operation Vertigo is a good example of cross border and 
European cooperation, where Europol coordinated actions of authorities from Germany, 
the Netherlands, Czech Republic, and Poland. Those countries were the first starting their 
operation towards a branch of fraudsters, which then expended also to other European 
states. Nevertheless, the coordination investigations of four most affected countries lead 
to arrest of 23 suspects and many more house searches. The lessons learned were 
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summarised in a common statement by Polish, German and Dutch prosecutors on 
November 2015 (Eurojust, 2016, p. 2):  
‘While still busy gathering and evaluating the outcome of the numerous procedural 
measures conducted during the action day, we can already say that the operation was 
a huge success, which was only made possible by the outstanding contributions from 
all the participants. It proves that working together in a JIT with support of Eurojust, 
Europol and the national authorities give us an advantage in the ongoing international 
battle against MTIC fraud’.  
That kind of operation shows the success of cooperation and how the future approach 
towards discovering fraud should be pursued. More explanation towards a proper 
approach and relevant solutions for VAT fraud detection and prevention are described in 
the next two chapters.   
4.2.2 Czech Republic registry attack 
In January 2011, the company OTE, a Czech electricity and gas operator and emission 
allowances registry, received a bomb threat call. The company’s building was evacuated so 
that the traders would not notice the cursors moving across computers screens (Funk, 
2015). The call was an obvious diversion from the phishing attack. It took only few minutes 
for the fraudsters to steal 1.175 million EUAs, at the time valued at 14 euros each, resulting 
in loss of more than EUR 16 million (Ainsworth, 2014, p. 5). As described by Mason (2011), 
the theft was only discovered the next day in the morning when clients of OTE started to 
report the missing EUAs. After that discovery, other countries were also affected by the 
phishing attack and the European authorities had to take action. From one day after the 
discovery of the fraud, the Czech exchange was closed until mid-March. In addition, all 
national registries across Europe were suspended for a short period. Another response was 
to introduce a different confirmation of transactions, mainly via two separate networks, 4-
eye principle and KYC checks. Those two solutions will be described in the following 
chapters. Eventually, the authorities discovered some of the involved fraudsters and 
convicted four members of a criminal gang from the UK. The four members were linked to 
the international gangs which were stealing EUAs already before and were convicted in 
September 2014 (Ainsworth, 2014, p. 6–7). According to Mason (2011) many of the 
involved in the fraud, mainly the true responsible stayed on the loose and disappeared with 
the stolen money.  
The track of stolen permits could be followed with the European Union Transaction Log or 
the Union Registry13. The first transaction of 500,000 EUAs was done from the Czech 
                                                            
13The Union registry is an online database that holds accounts for stationary installations (transferred from 
the national registries used before 2012) and for aircraft operators included in the EU ETS since January 2012, 
retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/registry_en.  
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registry to a Polish company, 1124 Segel SP ZOO Holding. After few minutes another 
transaction to the different Polish company, Huntingdon Sp. ZOO was made, and what 
makes it more interesting is that the company was registered in Liechtenstein. Therefore, 
no VAT was collected in Poland. In case the companies would be VAT applicable, that could 
be a MTIC or even carousel fraud. The transactions that followed were made to SVS 
Securities, an UK based company; and finally sold to Shell Trading International Ltd, which 
made payment in euros. Then the payment was converted to dollars and moved through 
firms all over the world, its track eventually being lost (Ainsworth, 2014, p. 7–8). Another 
discovery during the investigation was that around 13,100 EUAs matched the same serial 
number of stolen EUAs in Romania in 2010. That EUAs originated from Swiss company, 
Holcim, which lost its 1.6 million EUAs worth around EUR 24 million. When Holcim tried to 
follow the stolen EUAs it could only saw few chains, but could not discovered the end of 
the chain or more connections. Therefore, Holcim asked for the help from the EC, that is 
managing EU-ETS scheme, in order to freeze the credits which were stolen. However, the 
EC could not react further, since the matter was in hand of national law enforcement 
authorities. That result in fact that the stolen credits were never discovered. The 
consequence was a lawsuit against the EC, which was in the end discharged by the Court 
of Justice of the EU. Lastly, it is important to mention that Holcim is a company that 
received an enormous amount of EUAs as well as received around EUR 100 million in 2008, 
2009 when selling its access of EUAs (Funk, 2015). The chains of EUAs were a European 
responsibility, and since they did not take any proper action towards discovery of stolen 
EUAs that lead to lawsuit initiated by the company, which in the first place received an 
overload of EUAs. The complicated background of such cases show how inaccurate the 
maintenance of EU-ETS was, but also the issues with the lack of cooperation between 
authorities and European coordination. In rare cases such as the above-described 
operation Vertigo, a successfully coordinated investigation on a European level is seen. 
However, the majority of cases, such as Holcim, suffer from the lack of cooperation with 
the effect that fraudsters are never discovered.     
4.2.3 Connection to money laundering and organised crime 
Various sources among them Frunza (2012, p. 7) claimed a connection of VAT fraud to 
money laundering.  Given that money laundering as defined by the OECD and implemented 
in laws across the MS involves taking actions with the "proceeds of crime", it is inevitable 
that there would be a money laundering dimension.  The energy market itself has all 
necessary characteristics that attracted criminals from outside of Europe. When trying to 
look from the criminal mind perspective, entry into the market was very easy and setting 
up an account at the registry did not require any specific details or checks. Among other 
characteristics, which allowed perfect conditions for criminals to enter the energy market, 
the most important one is the lack of coordination, among at that time 27 MS (Frunza, 
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2012, p. 10). The MTIC scheme was likely used for money laundering and was connected 
with terrorist organisations. Frunza (ibid.) cites the classic paradigm that money laundering 
is implemented in three phases ‘placement, layering, integration’. The transactions are 
following the same path as in the case of the missing trader or carousel fraud. The 
placement phase is starting with a company X that is placed in a country A outside of the 
EU. The layering phase starts when the company X opens a subsidiary Y inside the EU 
(country B) and transfer its funds with possible dirty money in the system. The company Y 
buys EUAs from a broker and company Z (linked to company Y) sells the EUAs on the 
exchange, quickly transferring the EUAs from company Y trough buffers (Frunza, 2012, p. 
11). Frunza (2012, p. 12) offers an interesting approach on the calculation of the amount of 
laundered money on the emissions market, through calculation of turnover ratio, which 
represents ‘spot market volume divided by proportion of trading ratio (theoretical volume 
observed on the market) from the total allocation’. The analysis concludes that the 
turnover ratio, which should normally be around one, was 16 times higher in 2009 when 
VAT fraud occurred, because industries trade their surplus once a year. Additionally, 
around EUR 10 billion was the laundered amount during the period from August 2008 to 
December 2010. It is important to recognise that the approach and analysis made by Frunza 
is one of the first that is trying to connect market manipulation to VAT fraud and to define 
a clear line between VAT fraud and money laundering. Additionally, money laundering may 
be connected to terrorism and that VAT fraud is seen as a convenient tool by terrorist 
organisations to ensure themselves proper financing for their operations. There are many 
elements connected to these topics, therefore this part only included relevant information 
for VAT fraud and energy markets (Frunza, 2015, p. 14). Since there is a thin line between 
recognising market manipulation and VAT fraud, those borders are further elaborated in 
the solution’s chapter during the two interviews analysis.   
4.3 TRANSMISSION OF VAT FRAUD TO OTHER MARKETS 
This subchapter outlines the connection of VAT fraud from carbon markets to power or gas, 
which are, in addition to oil, the most relevant markets in the energy sector. Since this 
thesis mainly focuses on describing carbon fraud, because the largest losses occurred in 
the emissions sector, it is important to mention that there is an existing but less identified 
threat of VAT fraud also in the gas and electricity sectors as well as fear of fraud related to 
GOs. The fear of spreading from emission allowances to other energy commodities was a 
real concern after the discovery of carbon fraud. The European regulators took swift actions 
in order to prevent any form of VAT fraud from expanding further.  
The most concerning issue after the evaluation of carbon fraud was the spread of VAT fraud 
to electricity and gas market which were by nature similar and still not being regulated 
enough to eliminate the fraud in the best way. Regulators were aware of the fact that the 
energy market in Europe is still not well enough protected by market authorities, as it 
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should be in order to prevent the VAT fraud. The suspicion in the energy sector was raised 
when companies, which previously traded only with carbon allowances, announced that 
they would like to include other commodities in their portfolio. One of such cases was 
recognized in 2010 when the company Coer2 Commodities that was previously trading only 
on carbon emissions started trading with crude oil, natural gas, etc. Next, energy company 
CEZ, based in the Czech Republic quickly started to suspect smaller companies, which 
suddenly wanted to trade large volumes on the market. Those large volumes did not match 
the potential end-user demand of small companies and CEZ stopped trading with small 
companies for that reason (Frunza, 2015, p. 79). The connection can be also made with the 
phishing attack on the Czech registry that is described in the previous subchapter. There 
was common knowledge that fraudsters were operating in the market which are now more 
vulnerable due to lack of control or no RCM in place as in other countries that already 
experienced fraud and were now more careful.  The Czech market was one of the targets 
because it was easy for fraudsters to perform a fraud. After the companies as well as 
authorities realised the problems, they quickly introduced changes to prevent more losses. 
Other reported examples from the Netherlands, describe fraudsters of emissions trading 
that failed to register with the electricity transmission system operator. In the UK, the 
HMRC investigation team alerted on the possible MTIC fraud in the electricity market. The 
first action on the European level taken by energy exchanges was in 2010 to present interim 
measures (Frunza, 2015, p. 79–80). 
Considering that, the power and gas markets are very complex with a chain of different 
actors it would make it more difficult to effect prices but on the other hand giving more 
possibilities for a silent fraud. That is also the reason why cases on electricity and gas sector 
are very difficult to identify, which makes it complicated to assess how many cases are 
connected to VAT fraud only. Therefore, it is important to mention that the VAT fraud cases 
on electricity and gas are not straightforward as in the carbon sector. Many of them are 
related to other types of manipulation and take place simultaneously with money 
laundering. A real case of silent fraud that could happen in the gas or electricity market is 
described by Frunza (2015, 80) and despite involving minor volumes in terms of trading still 
outlines a possible fraud happening in the electricity sector in eastern European countries.  
The example that follows summarises a typical case for countries without measures against 
VAT fraud, thus without the RCM: 
An energy broker that is based in two European countries, e.g. Romania and Bulgaria 
proposes a swap14 between an electricity producer, based in Romania with a deficit in 
carbon allowances and shot liquidity, and a Bulgarian distributor. A broker that proposes a 
                                                            
14 Swap is a form of derivative contract between two parties that definessets a certain period (known as a 
window) in which cash flows are exchanged, retrieved from: https://www.investopedia.com/articles/ 
optioninvestor/07/swaps.asp.   
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swap, which means that the producer exports electricity from Romania and for that, 
receives carbon permits by the broker. Before next steps occur, it is important to know that 
the broker has two offices, one in Bulgaria and another in Romania. Once the agreement 
proposed by the broker was reached, the transactions took place. The company from 
Romania delivers the agreed amount of electricity for which the Bulgarian company pays 
the electricity to the broker’s office in Bulgaria, including VAT. The broker transfers the 
amount without VAT to the company in Romania and also buys carbon allowances for any 
of the main organised market places15, or in this case from a French broker. Then a three-
party agreement between two brokers and a company in Romania is signed. This 
agreement states that the French broker will deliver carbon permits to the Romanian 
company for which it will receive payment by Bulgarian company, excluding VAT. In reality 
the transaction is finalised in a way that the Romanian company pays to the broker’s office 
in Romania including VAT. The results are that the broker with two offices performs a very 
complex set of transactions and collects VAT from two different countries. The broker can 
perform many of such swaps and only after that closes the offices he established in order 
not to return VAT. That kind of fraud is almost impossible to detect due to two different 
subsidiaries under control of one broker (Frunza 2015, p. 37). This case represents the 
difficulty of detecting VAT fraud on the energy markets, with complex transactions as well 
as including contracts for physical delivery. That is the reason why discovery of VAT fraud 
in the electricity and gas sector is much lower compared to the discovery of fraud in the 
emissions sector.  
4.4 IDENTIFICATION OF BREACHES ON ELECTRICITY, GAS AND GOS 
MARKETS 
In 2010 one of the biggest newspapers in the UK, The Daily Telegraph published an article 
with the title ‘Taxman claims first cases of missing trader fraud in energy’ that refers to the 
switch from the carbon market to the gas and electricity markets. The author refers to 
carbon fraud as one of the fastest in history in terms of volume and the amount. The trades 
related to fraud took such rapid speed that it would not be a surprise if fraud would be 
transmitted to other markets with similar characteristics, meaning electricity and gas 
contracts. Immediately after the identification of a high amount of VAT losses in the carbon 
market, many experts were worried about a similar chain of events for other energy 
commodities, and they were right. According to Mason (2010), there were many cases in 
electricity and gas sector that were observed and spotted in the years after massive carbon 
                                                            
15 Organised market place is multilateral system that brings together and/or facilitates buying and selling 
interests of different third parties in order that those result in a contract, retrieved from: Article 4 (2) of 
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 1348/2014. 
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fraud. The governments and tax authorities across the EU issued warnings on the MTIC 
fraud spreading onto other sectors.  
There were two major cases, one for electricity and one for gas market reported and 
analysed by Norwegian Tax Authority (So young, 2017, p. 5). Those two cases were 
detected by tax administrators from Norway, who concluded that the losses of VAT fraud 
were around EUR 60 million. The fraud related to electricity market happen from 2013 to 
2014, and on the gas market in 2015. Both cases are also related and had its beginnings in 
carbon fraud chains. Below the modus operandi of fraud in electricity case is summarised, 
without real names of the involved companies, which were never published. The first step 
was the establishment of companies in different countries. Second, the electricity was 
traded in an EU Country A, different from the ones where the companies were established. 
Third, false invoicing was done in another EU Country B and money laundering performed 
in Norway. Fourth, the electricity traded in Country X was under control by one of the 
companies established in the first step; which then performed a missing trader in a country 
B for electricity delivered from Norway. Fifth, the missing trader in Country B performed 
onwards sales and collected VAT from the brokers; and did not pay the VAT from previously 
issued invoice. Last, brokers sold electricity to other power exchanges. In this case the 
carousel fraud does not have to be performed anymore because the goods can be again 
bought from the exchange. As a conclusion, it is relevant that even if the path of trades 
could be identified or at least outlined step by step, the final destination of the missing VAT 
was never discovered. It is presumed that the 8 - 12 % of profit accumulated by the 
fraudsters was transferred to bank accounts outside of EU (So young, 2017, p. 6).  
4.4.1 Reports to the regulatory authorities 
ACER coordinates breaches that are related to general market manipulation (in some 
instances that is connected to VAT fraud) between several MS together with financial 
regulators and European body responsible for financial stability, ESMA16. Such European 
authorities have an overview of the market and receive reports from market participants 
all over Europe. Those bodies are also bound by strict confidentiality rules and regulations, 
as would be expected pursuant to the general principles of EU law. Thus, the closer look 
into the potential manipulations reported to ACER could only present a general overview. 
Mainly the fraudsters of emission allowances moved from the first effected markets in the 
UK and France, which afterwards implemented necessary measures, to other smaller 
markets of the EU that did not implement the RCM. The next cases identified by European 
authorities happened with market participants registered in Czech Republic as well as in 
Poland (both cases are further described in this chapter). As ACER has its obligations to 
                                                            
16 ESMA is a European agency that provides stability and supervisions to European financial system. Retrieved 
from: https://www.esma.europa.eu/about-esma/who-we-are. 
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monitor and properly coordinate on the relevant investigations related to market 
manipulation on the energy market, a special internal monitoring approach was designed. 
The monitoring procedure includes five stages or so-called case lifecycles that are strictly 
followed by national regulatory authorities that are in charge of the investigation as well as 
ACER. The five stages of the case investigation lifecycle and what is included in each cycle 
are explained below (ACER, internal documents): 
Stage 1 - Monitoring (Surveillance): analysis of market activity and alerts triggered by 
internal monitoring system, preliminary data collection exercise and fact finding exercise, 
and finally initial assessment that provides first insights on the analysis of the potential 
manipulation; 
Stage 2 - Review/Pre-investigation: creating of the case and case handler assignments, 
notification to relevant authorities, request for information, and review of initial 
assessment; 
Stage 3 – Case investigation: decision to open a formal investigation and ACER coordination 
on main investigatory steps (especially in cross border cases) via platform for secure 
exchange of information between regulatory authorities. Next is the evidence collection 
and sharing of information (according to article 16 (4) a of REMIT Regulation), feedback 
from the regulatory authorities before the Statement of Objections/Case Claim and 
confirmation of the Claim that is followed by feedback to ACER before the Final Decision; 
Stage 4 – Enforcement: implementation of measures to change the behaviour of the 
market participant(s), handling of penalty notices, documentation of the measures, 
restitution order, statement of non-compliance with REMIT Regulation and press release 
coordination; and 
Stage 5 - Evaluation (post-decision): feedback to the surveillance analysts, evaluation of the 
case process, and national case law allocation.  
The above-explained steps are important to understand the necessary compliance with 
national and European rules, as well as the issues with long lasting processes for 
investigation. The first and second step are very much coordinated and shared between 
ACER and national regulators. The third step is the longest and most important one, where 
main evidence and justification is gathered. That step again involves and allocation of tasks 
as between ACER and national authorities. The fourth step is mainly the responsibility of 
national authorities, since ACER does not have legal grounds to perform actions. It implies 
finalisation of the investigation and leads to sanction decision. The fifth step is again 
common and applies to both European and national authorities in parallel.  
ACER can only go for REMIT breaches that may be connected to VAT fraud (namely under 
article 3 and 5 of REMIT). Due to the confidentiality of information and the reported data, 
the so-called cases can only be described showing the path of fraud and general effects but 
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hiding the names and other relevant details. An anonymous example of different scenarios 
and steps that follow related to handling the cross border cases are presented next. First 
example: one market participant located in Country A performed a suspicious transaction 
regarding a wholesale energy product with delivery in the same country. The transaction 
was performed on a trading platform located in Country B. Most of the evidence is expected 
to be located at the offices of the market participant in a MS A. In such event, the national 
authority from Country A is best placed to perform an investigation and possible 
enforcement on the case, since most of the impact was on that market and may be able to 
gather evidence required to prove infringements (assistance from Country B is relevant). 
Second example: one market participant located in Country B performs a suspicious 
transaction regarding wholesale energy product with delivery in Country A. That 
transaction was performed on a trading platform in Country B. Most of the evidence is 
expected to be located at the offices of the market participant in Country B. That means 
that both regulatory authorities would have issues when performing an investigation and 
later on enforcement (ACER, 2016, internal documents). In such examples, ACER 
establishes a cross border investigatory group, which states that ‘where it considers that 
the possible breach has, or has had, a cross-border impact, to establish and coordinate an 
investigatory group consisting of representatives of concerned national regulatory 
authorities …’ (REMIT Regulation, 2011, Article 16(4) c) and Article 16(2)). The cross border 
investigatory group procedure is extremely important for detecting VAT fraud in the energy 
market. It is common that tax fraud involves several jurisdictions; therefore, identification 
of which ones are most affected is the result of such investigatory groups. It implies that 
coordination is the best approach for the discovery of manipulation and the connected 
fraud.  
4.4.2 Recently reported incidents 
Although there are almost no publicly known cases, which would provide specific 
information other than fraud related to emission allowances, there are suggestions of the 
electricity and gas VAT fraud described by journalists. One of the most recent publications 
mentions fraudulent behaviour in the German gas market, more specifically fraud 
committed by the balancing group managers or the so-called shipper fraud. The behaviour 
allegedly took place in 2018 when market area managers discovered imbalances between 
inputs and offtakes in their accounts. After some investigation, they assumed that such 
behaviour and imbalances were created on purpose and that this will result in unpaid 
invoices. The balancing group managers took immediate action and closed balancing group 
accounts, as well as took legal actions. Currently there is no more publicly available 
information and the described events cannot provide a clear picture of what happened, or 
the damage to the market. In those sources the names of companies involved in the 
potential shipper fraud were not revealed. At first look, such type of events cannot be 
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connected to VAT fraud and it looks like it is only relevant for balancing managers. 
Nevertheless, it was identified that the connection to VAT fraud could be possible (Gaspool, 
2018).  
In connection to the above, Montel (2019) reported on the same events with reference to 
a different European market. The news mentioned fraudulent behaviour on three gas hubs 
(TTF, NCG and Gaspool), taking place at the end of 2018. The intentional imbalance further 
resulted in misleading financial settlement incurring approximately EUR 16 million cost on 
the Dutch market. The Dutch market area managers initiated legal proceedings against the 
company, the same as in the German market. Additionally, market area managers 
amended the terms of balancing contracts in order to prevent such suspicious behaviour.  
On 2 May 2019, a Spanish newspaper published an article referring to an investigation by 
Spanish national regulatory authority and Spanish government for alleged gas fraud. 
Several market operations caused an imbalance on the gas markets with a cost of EUR 40 
million, which had to be covered by the Spanish transmission system operator. The first 
company identified for alleged fraud on the gas market is the company Solstar, registered 
in Ireland. As in the previous two incidents (where it is not confirmed which company is 
potentially manipulating the market) the transmission system operator decided to take 
precautionary measures against Solstar and banned its operations from the Spanish 
market. What happened is that the company simply sold the amount of gas that it did not 
have and charged for it, creating a huge imbalance and potential case related to VAT fraud. 
Moreover, another company Gasela, has been acting as a counterparty of Solstar, and was 
the buyer of the gas that was never delivered. The article also refers to the same situation, 
which already occurred in the Netherlands and another EU country (it could be assumed 
that in Germany where imbalancing was also reported). Finally, the general opinion of the 
market operators is to perform regulatory changes on the European level in order to be 
able to prevent fraudulent companies for entering the market, and to act as soon as there 
is a suspicion of fraud (CincoDias, 2019).  
It is obvious that more investigation is necessary to clearly identify the events that took 
place on the wholesale gas market that is described above. Since such behaviour was 
spread across at least three European wholesale energy markets, the next possible 
assumption is that there is a manipulation taking its place in another MS, which still did not 
realise the ongoing fraud. In the cases above, neither VAT fraud nor shipper fraud is 
confirmed. Instead, the news only report on the start of investigations in several MS, which 
will take few months to perform analysis and clearly show if manipulation on the market 
really took place.  
The Norwegian tax authority reported another recent event in relation to VAT fraud in the 
market of GOs. The conclusion came from the head of the tax authority, Hans Christian 
Holte, who claims that criminals are using GOs market as a tool for VAT fraud even outside 
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of Norway. That statement is supported by Norwegian transmission system operator, 
which saw more than 30 foreign companies trying to join their registry for trading with GOs. 
Those companies are mainly registered in the EU, but there are some from United Arab 
Emirates. Tax authorities are well aware that the surge of GOs prices in the recent years is 
making it an attractive market for fraudsters. The overall increase of 200 % of GOs prices is 
reported from autumn 2017. Even more worrying is the fact that almost none of the MS 
have RCM in place (Vilnes, 2019).   
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5 POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO COUNTER VAT FRAUD 
The fifth chapter looks over possible solutions to counter VAT fraud, with a division 
between already implemented and non-implemented (mainly technology based) solutions. 
The first subchapter examines one of the most obvious and widespread solution – the RCM. 
The implementation of the RCM in the EU countries is presented as key grounds for other 
solutions that are based on the improvement of the existing system. Every solution 
presented further identifies main advantages and disadvantages, which are in the end of 
this chapter summarised in the table. 
5.1 REVERSE CHARGE MECHANISM 
Before the more detailed overview of the RCM as a solution, a division between the 
international and the domestic RCM is presented. The international as well as the domestic 
RCM has its legal basis in articles 38 and39 (related to and 39, which state: ‘…the place of 
supply shall be deemed to be the place where that taxable dealer has established his 
business…’ (VAT Directive, 2006, Article 38) and ‘where such a supply is not covered by 
Article 38, the place of supply shall be deemed to be the place where the customer 
effectively uses and consumes the goods…’ (VAT Directive, 2006, Article 39). The 
international RCM additionally refers to article 195 (related to RCM) of the VAT Directive, 
and states that the RCM is applicable for gas and electricity delivery between two MS or 
business that have seats in different EU countries. The implementation of international 
RCM is obligatory for all MS, which means that the issued invoice do not charge the VAT. 
Instead, is the recipient who calculates and pays the VAT. The domestic RCM has also its 
legal basis in  Articles 38 and39is related to article 199a of the VAT Directive, and Article 
199 (refers to the RCM, which is applicable for the business inside the same country without 
an obligation to implement it. Therefore, some countries implement the domestic RCM and 
some do not (Europex, 2017, p. 14). The more detailed legislative framework and 
implementation of RCM by different MS is explained below as well as the issues connected 
with inconsistent implementation of RCM.  
5.1.1 Change of the legislative framework 
The first idea behind the RCM was to simplify trading system inside the EU, after the 
establishment of single market. When the reporting of the VAT is moved from the seller to 
the buyer that eliminates the requirement of sellers to register in the country to which they 
deliver their supply of goods or services (Frunza, 2019, p. 266). The background for the 
introduction of the RCM related to the energy sector are of course heavy losses that were 
identified by the MS due to the VAT fraud and especially the missing trader scheme. The 
main frauds that occurred were related to the Bluenext, which was the main reason for 
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implementation of the RCM in some MS. EU had to respond quickly, and more pressure 
was put onto changing the old VAT regime, which was starting to become less effective. 
The main rule from Article 193 of the VAT Directive states that: ‘VAT shall be payable by 
any taxable person carrying out a taxable supply of goods and services, except where it is 
payable by another person in the cases referred to in Articles 194 to 199 and Article 202’ 
(VAT Directive, 2006, Article 193). Based on that system several missing trader frauds 
occurred. It is important to mention that the VAT directive served as a framework for 
transitional VAT system, when applying the origin-based system. Two different cross border 
transactions that are featured in the VAT directive are an intra EU exempt supply (VAT 
exempted) and intra EU acquisition (taxed in the country of origin) (European Commission, 
2014a, p. 4).  
Due to this form of transactions, the VAT gap became bigger and a new proposal, amending 
the VAT directive was implemented. Council Directive 2013/43/EU provided a few 
amendments because of the serious frauds that occurred in specific sectors, among them 
carbon emissions fraud with a link to the electricity and gas VAT frauds. Article 199a was 
amended as follows (Council Directive 2013/43/EU, 2013, Article 1 (2) (a)): ‘Member States 
may, until 31 December 2018 and for a minimum period of two years, provide that the 
person liable for payment of VAT is the taxable person to whom any of the following 
supplies are made:’. Under the paragraph 1, among other, the following points were added 
(Council Directive 2013/43/EU, 2013, Article 1 (2) (e) (f)): ‘e) supplies of gas and electricity 
to a taxable dealer as defined in Article 38(2)’ and ‘f) supplies of gas and electricity 
certificates’. Those main amendments, of the Council Directive 2013/43/EU, were mostly 
on the Article 199 to give the MS the possibilities on using the RCM as optional and 
temporary option and to expand that option on the added goods and services. Additionally, 
the amendments included a necessary report of the MS, deciding on the implementation 
of the RCM, to the VAT committee. One of the main points of the report was to include the 
scope of the applying RCM, actions for informing the relevant taxable persons together 
with date of commencement as well as the evaluation criteria, which would enable 
comparison before and after the application of the RCM (Directive 2013/43/EU, 2013, p. 
2).  
The proposal for generalised implementation of RCM was a subject of many debates, but 
the most relevant was the Proposal for a Council Directive, made on 25 May 2018 by the 
EC (European Commission, 2018). The main changes were to prolong the possibility to 
apply RCM and secondly, to use a Quick Reaction Mechanism (hereinafter QRM) in order 
to combat VAT fraud. The latter enables a faster procedure in allowing MS to introduce the 
RCM in comparison with the standard procedure according to article 199a derogations.  
The main change proposed was to extend the period of application of the RCM until 30 
June 2022. On that date, the definitive arrangements for intracommunity business-to-
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business supplies of goods shall enter into force. Additionally, the proposal to delete the 
requirement of a minimum of two years for the application of RCM transpired to be a 
serious obstruction for MS that wished to introduce RCM in 2017. Moreover, the 
explanatory memorandum mentioned other proposals made in 2017. Out of these reports, 
two main legislative proposals also confirmed by the EC are mentioned, first, the 
administrative cooperation on strengthening cooperation between MS, and second, the 
implementation of cornerstones for simpler VAT system within the EU. The overall goal of 
this is to tackle the VAT frauds in a more consistent way between MS, based on their 
provided feedback (European Commission, 2018a). 
The prolongation of the article 199a and 199b of the VAT Directive was amended in the 
Council Directive 2018/1695 on 6 November 2018. The already proposed extension until 
30 June 2022 was therefore confirmed (Council Directive (EU) 2018/1695, 2018). 
Furthermore, the energy sector community made an important statement on the support 
for the extension of the Article 199a of the VAT directive, on 4 September 2018. On that 
date Europex published a summarised statement of eighteen representatives of the energy 
sector, calling on the Council to prioritize the above-mentioned proposal. The energy 
sector's statement is recommending the following four measures that tackle important 
issues the energy sector is dealing with. First, they called for the timely adoption of the 
proposal from May 2018, which is necessary for MS in order to continue with their current 
practices. Secondly, the energy sector believes that the prolongation period for Article 199a 
RCM is extremely short and should therefore be extended until 31 December 2023, despite 
an ongoing procedure for definitive RCM for goods. Third, the GOs, which are similar in 
nature to emission allowances, should be added to a list of goods under Article 199a. 
Fourth, a comprehensive application of the RCM among all MS and for the energy sector 
should be added within the call for the proposal (Europex, 2018). As explained, the above 
proposal accepts the prolongation of RCM, as well as confirms the possibility of 
introduction of QRM, but does not further touch on the other two more energy focused 
proposals that were not considered for the latest amendment of the VAT directive. It is 
expected that due to the recent VAT fraud movement on the energy market more 
amendments from the biggest energy players would be proposed.  
5.1.2 Comparison of RCM coverage between different energy commodities 
The figures in this sub-chapter have been taken from the presentation made by Europex in 
2017 and are showing a geographical representation of the implementation of RCM for 
four different commodities: emissions allowances, electricity and gas, and GOs. All three 
maps are showing the implementation of the RCM across the EU MS (Europex, 2017). 
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Figure 13: Reverse charge mechanism coverage for emission allowances market 
Source: Europex (2017, p. 16) 
The figure 13 above shows that with the exemption of the Baltic States, Croatia and Cyprus 
the reverse charge taxation on emission trading has been introduced in all jurisdictions in 
the EU. The reasons behind are evident, the spread of VAT fraud across the MS has lead 
them to quickly adopt the necessary measures and the RCM was an obvious solution. 
Comparing the findings for the emissions trading sector with gas and electricity trading 
(outlined in the figure 14) major differences become apparent (Europex, 2017, p. 16):  
1. Spain has only introduced reverse charge taxation for wholesale electricity trading 
but not for wholesale gas trading. 
2. Eastern European countries that became EU MS mainly in 2004 have not 
implemented reverse charge taxation yet. 
3. Nordic countries (big power market high probability of fraud on electricity and not 
the gas market) did not implement reverse charge taxation.  
The figure 14 related to the gas and electricity sector is showing inconsistency across the 
EU and a need for more aligned approach. The evidence from the analysis of cases in 
Chapter four shows how quickly fraud can be moved from one country to another, which 
is the same that happened in the case of emission allowances until majority of MS 
implemented the RCM. The fear of VAT fraud on electricity and gas markets moving to the 
countries identified under three points above (the ones that did not implemented the RCM) 
is therefore justified. The assumption is done on the basis that fraudsters would follow the 
same approach as with the emission allowances.   
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Figure 14: Reverse charge mechanism coverage for electricity and gas markets 
 
Source: Europex (2017, p. 17) 
The figure 15 below represents the status of the reverse charge taxation related to the 
trading of GOs. Only a very small number of MS namely prominent producers of renewable 
energy have introduced reverse charge taxation so far. Taking note of expanding trading 
volumes of GOs on major marketplaces, as well as on the over the counter market, it can 
be reasonable to suspected that fraudsters have found a new area in which to develop. 
While there has no identified VAT fraud cases to take place in the GOs market, it can be 
assumed that in the future, if no measures are taken such cases will appear. Other reasons 
could be that those markets are neither well established nor controlled by the authorities, 
meaning that no existing VAT fraud could be discovered. Those assumptions cannot be 
confirmed with certainty until the real control and analysis of the market is performed, that 
is today happening only in the gas and electricity market.   
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Figure 15: Reverse charge mechanism coverage for guarantees of origin 
 
Source: Europex (2017, p. 18) 
5.1.3 Limits to the concept 
VAT fraud remains a significant concern for the European wholesale energy markets as long 
as not all MS have implemented RCM. This is stipulated by the relevant national tax laws; 
the legal provisions may deduce the existence of a VAT exempted cross border trade or 
intracommunity trade solely from the registered seat of the company that enters into 
trading. This may lead to the following example case: power that has been produced and 
consumed within the same specific balancing area inside Germany, and physically never 
left it, could be subject to a cross border trade if one of the participating trading parties is 
registered in Croatia or Greece, as both countries did not implement the RCM. Therefore, 
relevant price signals produced by large exchanges can still be negatively influenced by VAT 
fraud although that the countries where the organised market place is physically located 
or where the power is physically delivered both have introduced the RCM already. 
Moreover, the RCM was introduced as a ‘quick fix’ by certain MS due to the heavy 
distortions on the market. It was too late for MS governments to assess which of the 
existing solutions would best tackle the ongoing issues of VAT fraud in 2009 (Frunza, 2019, 
p. 267).  
Despite some of the drawbacks, the RCM has proven as the quickest tool (QRM contributed 
to that fact) as well as the effective way of eliminating VAT frauds. The advantages of the 
RCM are that it does not involve reimbursement or the payment of the VAT anymore (ibid.). 
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In addition, Europex, as a representative of various energy organisations around Europe, 
saw it as a necessary measurement to implement RCM across Europe in order to eliminate 
spread of VAT fraud.   
5.2 ZERO-RATE DEROGATION 
Zero-rate derogation is not included in the VAT Directive, since its goal is to introduce a 
minimum VAT rate across the EU, in the amount of 15 %. Despite that, the zero-rate 
remained in some of the EU MS, mainly in the UK and Ireland. The EU system allowed 
special derogations for those countries and qualified the zero-rate onto the field of special 
rates. Zero-rate means that consumer does not pay the VAT on sales but still have the right 
to deduct VAT, which was paid on purchases outside of the EU (Your Europe, 2019).  
According to Keen and Smith (2007, p. 4) the reduced tax to zero for wholesale trades is 
similar to the old system where all transactions on the wholesale market are reduced to 
zero indifferent whether they are cross-border or within the same jurisdiction. The feature 
of zero-rating the exports could be susceptible to fraud and attract many criminals. When 
the exports are zero-rated, the VAT chain is somehow broken at the ‘interface of domestic 
and foreign tax administrators’ (Keen and Smith, 2007, p. 12). The reason explained by 
Smith (2013, p. 10) implies the enforcement vulnerability that lead to carousel fraud and 
other schemes. Additionally, the zero-rating exports also create high compliance costs, 
especially for business, which have administrative and form filling burdens. Moreover, 
because the tax systems are so different the compliance cost differ as well, and that has a 
potential to distort economic activity and trade patterns. Difference can be found between 
domestic and international procedures described at the beginning of this chapter. 
Additionally, Frunza (2019, p. 266) explains the VAT exemption as a ‘quick fix’, considered 
as an efficient solution for market having serious issues with VAT fraud. A drawback states 
the distortion of the competition between companies as well as not acting as proper 
prevention mechanism only being implemented in certain countries. If implemented, a 
coordination between MS is almost an obligation as otherwise such solution could have 
more negative than positive effects.  
5.3 TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS 
Traditional measures that could combat and prevent the existing threat of VAT fraud are 
slowly becoming less effective. Below are outlined the most relevant technological 
solutions mainly related to artificial intelligence or machine learning that could prevent VAT 
fraud in the future and are related to existing mechanisms in the energy market.  
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5.3.1 Digital invoice customs exchange 
Ainsworth (2014, p. 8) describes digital invoice customs exchange (hereinafter DICE) as the 
‘technology-intensive tax compliance regime for VAT that utilizes invoice encryption to 
safeguard transactional data exchange between seller and buyer’. The main point is that 
DICE provides a real-time checks and responses, and it is therefore a very useful tool for 
MTIC fraud prevention. The two elements,  digital invoice and customs exchange are 
described separately and following a systematic approach.  
Digital invoice is a regime that is useful when modification inside the national regimes is 
done, meaning that all invoices become digital. There are six steps to develop digital invoice 
systems, summarised below as described by Ainsworth (2014, p. 11):  
1) The seller generates an electronic file that is a pro-forma invoice with necessary 
contract, tax information and digital signatures included in the file, which is than 
transmitted to the tax administration; 
2) Tax administration performs an authorisation of the received request – the 
potential benefits of this steps are automatic process, constant availability and basic 
check for accuracy; 
3) Correct file is saved, by tax administration and electronic signature is produced 
acting as an access key and the document is part of shared system or so-called 
ledger17; 
4) The seller would issue and transmit an invoice, including the access key to the 
buyer; 
5) The buyer uses the access key to check and validate the invoice, then the same 
steps, in the opposite way follow in order to obtain the file, which should in the end 
match with the file produced by the seller; and 
6) A copy of the file produced by the buyer is transmitted to the seller and true invoice 
is issued, that would allow necessary services to take place. 
Customs exchange is more complicated due to the fact that foreign suppliers need to 
comply with national tax law, and it involves two additional steps described below: 
7) The tax administration in the destination country issues authorisation for the use of 
the second key, and simultaneously notify another tax authority as well as again 
sharing the copy of the file; and 
8)  The buyer receives the file and confirms the acceptance of the file to the seller.  
                                                            
17A ledger is accounting system that was contains transactions and keeps track who owns what. Ledger used 
to be understood as a centralised, until Blockchain, retrieved from: http://www.ofnumbers.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/Permissioned-distributed-ledgers.pdf. 
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The preconditions for that are that in a certain exchange, both involved jurisdictions have 
digital invoicing in place. Additionally, a VAT invoice can be issued either in a fifth or in last 
step of the process described above (Ainsworth, 2014, p. 14). 
Figure 16: DICE scheme 
 
 
Source: Ainsworth (2014, p. 10) 
DICE can be seen as one of the new technologies providing solution to the emerging VAT 
fraud in energy market, since it was designed with the purpose of control over cross border 
transactions. Especially considering the fraud cases on emission allowances that are 
contaminating other energy commodities. Ainsworth (2014, p. 17–18) believes that fraud 
occurred in the field of emissions allowances offered lessons for the future and a good 
incentive for what kind of approach should be used for transactions related to VAT fraud in 
the field of other energy commodities. For secure transactions on the spot and futures 
wholesale and retail markets, he proposes a construction of an Independent Transaction 
Log, digital invoice system designed especially for energy commodity market and last, 
invoice cross-checking system. A real-time transaction database for energy markets in the 
EU is possible. As Ainsworth (2016, p. 9–11) further describes the prerequisite of DICE is a 
centralised database. The two main systems already developed are either a transactional 
database from one tax authority (example of Rwanda) or collection of data from more 
authorities (example of Brazil). In the EU, the national tax authorities have centralised and 
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non-shared databases but still need to function together in a community. DICE is a system 
that can enable efficient sharing of data between different jurisdictions inside the EU. The 
EU DICE system would allow fast sharing of encrypted ‘public access keys’ and to ensure a 
save and smooth sharing of information. The regime allows for the complete overview of 
any transactions that occurs between tax authorities, either intracommunity or extra-
community in real time and it can certainly detect fraud faster than the existing systems 
currently applied on the market. On the other hand, it does not perform the function of 
real-time risk analysis same as with Blockchain which will be described in the next section. 
DICE can be seen as a preliminary step or necessary precondition of Blockchain. Regarding 
the relation to the energy sector DICE was not implemented to EU ETS since (Ainsworth, 
2014, p. 17), the market did not have the correct system in place and after such huge 
volumes of tax were stolen, the emission allowances were not anymore considered as 
taxable services. That condition was implemented on January 3, 2017 (Ainsworth, 2014, p. 
18) and then extended until January 2018 (European Commission, 2016b, p. 2).  
5.3.2 Blockchain and VATCoin 
The Blockchain technology was created in 2008 and prominently used with the Bitcoin. 
Blockchain is defined as a digital data structure, which in a chronological order logs data 
transactions in a distributed ledger. Since transactions are aggregated into so-called blocks, 
which form a chain, the name speaks for itself. One of the most important factors is building 
a trusted network of users, and therefore abolishing the traditional centralized system and 
introducing a completely new management of transactions (Andoni, et al., 2019, p. 145). 
In the energy sector, many benefits, such as improving internal processes, secure transfer, 
diminishing administrative burdens are identified as positive outcomes of Blockchain. One 
of the most relevant ones is the prevention of fraudulent behaviour, since it offers clearer 
processes and even goes as far as to propose a global market for energy commodities or 
involvement of SMART meters. The benefits as defined by Andoni et al. (2019, p. 163) are 
the transparency, automatic certification of consumers’ energy production, prevention of 
double spending. On the other hand, it is important to mention the limitations of the 
Blockchain concept, which is associated with certification and with the verification of 
services. So far, only known exchanges, such as Nasdaq, performed the run of pilot 
platforms with green certificates and use of smart contracts to trade and track carbon 
allowances. Other ideas were generated via start-up companies, which mainly focus on 
integration trough a trusted and decentralised platform, which should allow users efficient 
coordination when trading (Andoni et al., 2019, p. 163). Such platforms would allow to 
eliminate an intermediate and speed up the process which is the key to discovery of any 
type of non-physical fraud. These automatic checks would prevent what other older system 
such as VIES could not.  
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Another future solution for fraud prevention, defined by Alwohaibi, Cheetham and Tirand 
(2018, p. 17) is VATCoin. By nature, VATCoin is very similar to Bitcoin, the so-called first 
cryptocurrency. The difference is that VATCoin is based on tax and it is not subject to 
speculations, but instead acts as a fixed regular tax and it is not public as Bitcoin is. There 
are different opinions whether the VATCoin Blockchain should be private or public. 
Regardless of which one is more appropriate, the transactions would be ‘X sends Y number 
of VATCoins to Z’ (Ainsworth, et al. 2018, p. 18). EC has been struggling with the VAT system 
and its flaws ever since the introduction of the single market, and the Blockchain system 
might be the possible way forward to a new improved system. The solution becomes more 
obvious with the fact that the MTIC fraud for electricity and gas occur in the virtual could 
or economy. Meaning, that it can only at the beginning or the end when the intersection 
with the real economy occurs (Ainsworth et al, 2018, p. 2). Thus the solution of VATCoin as 
tool for VAT fraud elimination on the energy market seems like a proper one. Ainsworth et 
al (2016, p. 13) explains the benefits of VATCoin immunity of cyber-attacks is entirely 
different than for the emission allowances, where both exist as a computer code in a secure 
computer system. Nevertheless, the VATCoin is immunity comes from become worthless if 
stolen, which related to non-redeemable currency and the fact that governments only are 
responsible for converting VATCoin into cash. Other positive aspects of such technology 
are less administrative burdens for consumers as well as compliance facilitation. The high 
quality artificial intelligence ensure risk analysis, which comes from already tested 
algorithms (Ainsworth, Alwohaibi, Cheetam, 2016, p. 20).  
Despite the fact that there is great benefit associated with VATCoin introduction there are 
some drawbacks that should be considered. First, the joint implementation with DICE or 
‘coupling VATCoin with DICE’ (Ainsworth et al, 2018, p. 30), which by itself does not 
represent a real drawback but combined adds another component that might not be 
expected when deciding to implement such system. Additional, while such combination 
might be eligible for some systems such as Gulf Cooperation Countries employing 
technology advance and VAT fraud proof systems, it might not be the case for the EU 
(Ainsworth, Alwohaibi, Cheetam, 2016, p. 1, 2). Second, the computing capacity that would 
ensure storage of all EU cross border transactions. Although it can be estimated how much 
transaction should be stored, the current systems in place probably do not have such 
capacity and would therefore need to be upgraded (Ainsworth et al, 2018, p. 28).  
5.3.3 VLN, RTvat, D-VAT solutions and their differences 
5.3.3.1 VLN 
A VAT Locator Number (hereinafter VLN) system is one of the easiest solutions to be 
implemented for VAT fraud prevention and requires less disruptions to the existing VAT 
system. The originator of VLN solution was Dr. Michael Cheetham, who presented it to the 
59 
 
House of Lords hearing on 25 May 2007 as a specific targeted solution focusing only on 
prevention of MTIC fraud. The VLN system proposes that each invoice contains an 
encrypted secure number that is unique for each transaction. The system is controlled from 
one central computer system, probably managed by the government where it performs 
automated validations and requests (Bukhsh & Weigand, 2015, p. 3). Since the VLN is either 
numerical or a bar code, it can be scanned with a reader, which would allow for very fast 
verification of the invoice. Additionally, an example explained by Ainsworth (2011, p. 5) 
shows how each transaction contains information adding to the previous one, thus allowing 
for recognition of irregularities and tracking backwards. With reconstruction of previous 
transactions, a suspicion could be raised with tax authorities, which would prevent VAT 
from being paid. The most positive aspect of VLN is that VAT is never paid to businesses 
with invalid VLN and could therefore completely eliminate MTIC fraud. VLN is the only one 
out of those three solutions that can be implemented for one country alone without any 
cooperation needed.  
5.3.3.2 RTvat 
Real time VAT (hereinafter RTvat) is a very similar tool than the VLN in a way that it requires 
a centralised system in order to track all transactions. It goes further in respect that 
eliminates the possibility of fraudulent payment, not like VLN that recognise and deals with 
suspicion only after its identification. As the name implies, the goal of such system is to 
perform as much as possible real-time control. That is done in the way that its taxation is 
changed to the settlement date, instead of the taxation on the invoice as currently 
implemented. The RTvat is an origin-based tax system (Bukhsh & Weigand, 2015, p. 3). 
According to Ainsworth (2011, p. 8) this system completely eliminates MTIC but it has its 
drawbacks when it comes to more complex VAT avoidance schemes since its unable to 
address data security and data collection issues in a proper way.  
5.3.3.3 D-VAT 
Digital VAT (hereinafter D-VAT) works in a way similar then VLN with certification of 
systems between buyers and sellers. Another name for D-VAT could be ‘certified tax 
software’ and the following requirements also summarise its basic features: correct VAT 
calculation for each transaction; preparing of invoices; ensuring the link between VAT 
outputs and inputs to have correct VAT returns, and; completing VAT returns process. As 
in both proposals before, the process is automated (Bukhsh & Weigand, 2015, p. 3). D-VAT 
is considered to be a private sector based solution in comparison between VLT and RTvat, 
which are strictly related to the government or public administration based solutions.  
What is common to all three technologies presented above is that they all require an 
investment in technology. Their general aim is to prevent MTIC fraud before it takes place, 
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thus completely eliminating the possibility for its development. At least in theory, all three 
technologies could work well when implemented in the EU tax systems, but until today 
those technologies are only seen as a proposal for the EU market. In connection to the VAT 
fraud related to energy market these technologies could be implemented in the same way 
as any other commodity or/and financial instruments.  
5.4 SOLUTIONS OVERVIEW  
Table 1 below firstly classify possible solutions to overcome VAT fraud on the energy 
markets into two categories. First category focuses on the non-implemented solutions, 
mainly related to the field of technological solutions, and second, on the implemented or 
existing solutions in the EU energy market.  
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Table 1: Overview of implemented and non-implemented solutions 
 Proposed solution Advantages Disadvantages 
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DICE 
Self-verification;  
Fast checks;  
Automated procedures, and 
Real-time storage of data 
Implementation of new 
technology and costly 
systems; 
Unified approach by all 
MS 
Blockchain and VATCoin 
Real-time risk analysis;  
Consensus mechanism that 
equals trusted system; 
No cyber-attacks 
Lack of trust of users; 
Coupling VATCoin with 
DICE; 
Computing capacity 
VLN 
Fast implementation; 
Independent system (no need 
for cooperation between MS) 
Investment required; 
Centralised system means 
higher security risk 
RTvat 
Real-time detection of VAT 
fraud 
Investment required; 
Data security and data 
collection issues  
D-VAT 
Real-time detection of VAT 
fraud 
Investment required; 
Im
p
le
m
en
te
d
 s
o
lu
ti
o
n
s Reverse charge mechanism 
Proven to be effective tool 
against VAT fraud; 
Easily applicable  
Introduced as a quick fix; 
Not obligatory for all MS; 
Administrative burden 
related to tax fillings  
VAT reduction to zero 
If implemented by all MS the 
VAT fraud would be eliminated 
immediately; 
Acts as a quick fix for highly 
effected markets with VAT 
fraud (easily applicable) 
Existing risks of VAT fraud; 
High compliance costs; 
Only possible with 
consistent approach; 
Distortion of competition 
among companies 
Source: Own elaboration 
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6 EXPERT’S OPINION 
The sixth chapter is based on the expert opinion concluded from two interviews that were 
performed with the employees of ACER, which are dealing with energy manipulation 
related topics on a daily basis. During the two interviews, a general opinion of both experts 
was that VAT fraud should be maintained in a better way and that more progress towards 
an equal approach among MS is necessary in order to prevent it. Although the proposed 
solutions are similar in a way that both are adopting a European approach, the following 
considerations need to be taken in account. The subchapter on active market surveillance 
points towards VAT fraud detection and subchapter on national and European cooperation 
points towards VAT fraud prevention. The titles of subchapters and their subsections 
already represent key solutions or rather future goals proposed by experts during 
interviews. Those proposed solutions are then further elaborated in the text. Questions 
asked during the two interviews are provided in the Appendix I. In addition, the 
questionnaire formulated with nine questions was shared with energy experts in the EU. 
The questions, which are closely linked to the two interview discussions, were focused on 
the topic of VAT detection and prevention in line with some of the solutions already 
proposed in the previous chapter as well as new proposals that could be implemented. 
The main outcome of this chapter is to present an up-to-date opinion of today’s fast 
changing energy markets in contrast with the previous more exhaustive solutions. This 
chapter aims to highlight VAT fraud issue from a different angle trying to provide a wider 
and European focused perspective rather than analysis of individual experts, such as in the 
chapter five. At the end, the proposed solutions are gathered together in the table, 
following the structure of the table 1 provided at the end of previous chapter.  
6.1 ACTIVE MARKET SURVEILLANCE  
As defined under the Recital 4 of REMIT Regulation (2011, p. 1) a strong interlink between 
energy markets already exists in today’s Europe. Market abuse that exists in one MS also 
affects entities in another MS and for that reason strong cross border monitoring and 
surveillance is necessary. Not only that the wholesale market is concerned with market 
abuse but the prices on retail market can be affected as well. For that reason, the integrity 
of the market is a joint concern of all MS. The REMIT Regulation was established for the 
purpose of monitoring the European wholesale energy markets and to prevent 
manipulation on the market, including VAT fraud. In order to be able to control and achieve 
goals proposed by the REMIT Regulation, a European body such as ACER was tasked with 
the implementation of the articles in the mentioned regulation. One of the main tasks ACER 
had to perform is the monitoring of the wholesale energy markets in order to prevent 
market manipulation and abuse. ACER’s market surveillance and conduct department is 
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working towards ensuring a hands-on market surveillance, which is done in both 
automated and manual ways with overlooking of suspicious transactions that are identified 
when an internally designed alerts trigger (European Union Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators, 2016).  
The outcome of the first interview shows importance of detection and then further 
prevention of the market abuse, therefore validating or rejecting the second hypothesis. 
The below subtitles are two main outcomes that were discussed during the interview with 
an expert in charge of the surveillance of the wholesale energy markets.  
6.1.1 Centralized European surveillance 
The factor seen as one of the best ways forward when talking about detection of VAT fraud 
on the energy market is centralised European wide surveillance. Once fraud has already 
taken place, a wide overview of gathered information is the solution to detect fraudsters 
in the fastest way possible. The basics for that are already formulated in the market 
surveillance strategy approach made by ACER that covers different surveillance aspects of 
the European energy markets. The starting point is to ensure the best possible surveillance 
coverage of EU wholesale energy markets and hence to minimise the risk of undetected 
breaches of the REMIT Regulation. In view of this, ACER decided to assess which wholesale 
energy markets and products are currently subject to surveillance by national regulatory 
authorities (hereinafter NRAs), in order to identify any surveillance gaps across the EU. 
Therefore, ACER regularly performs surveillance gap analysis based on the feedback from 
NRAs. In other words, ACER has all the necessary available information that would allow 
executing centralised control over European energy markets and prevention of cross 
border fraud from taking place. Obstacles for such system are in the first place a lack of 
surveillance resources and the complicated legal nature, due to disagreement between MS 
on who should monitor and what aspects of the energy markets. Thirdly, the quality of data 
reported to ACER would need to be significantly improved in order to be able to perform 
control of European wide monitoring and keeping a clear picture of cross border 
transactions. The improvement of data quality is seen as the key for the successful 
monitoring and fast detection of fraud. It is of extreme importance already today in relation 
with other monitoring activities and it will play an important role in the future. Overall, the 
European wide market surveillance could be a potentially be the easiest and fastest 
solution for VAT prevention, but it could also represent an issue if not properly 
implemented across the EU MS (Interview I, Market Surveillance Expert). 
6.1.2 Harmonisation of VAT 
The second proposed solution of harmonisation of VAT in EU MS would eliminate many 
issues related to cross border taxation that exist between MS today. Again, that solution 
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represents centralisation, but this time done by the MS themselves. The agreement on 
general EU tax should be of course done at the EU level as a first step, but would require a 
national implementation, as a main step. A common VAT tax would completely eliminate 
issues with cross border fraud, since all MS would be eligible to receive equal share of the 
tax paid by market participants in one common network. Other issues such as national 
fraud would still be possible, but the carousel fraud or missing trader would be eliminated 
with such system in place.  A downside of this strategy is limiting the fiscal and budgetary 
flexibility of the MS, which may be unpalatable to some MS. 
The main issue with tax harmonisation as a solution to counter VAT fraud is slow 
coordination between MS and unwillingness to harmonise their tax rates due to the 
possible adaptation to lower rates with MS that introduce higher tax rates then other MS. 
Since the differences between countries in respect of VAT rates are very high that solution 
would be difficult to implement but it remains as a possible proposal, which could be 
implemented for the reasons of growing centralisation in the field of energy sector today. 
The energy sector is rapidly changing towards a more linked and centralised system. That 
raises the question of why does it not focus on solving the issue of VAT fraud and 
implementing more harmonisation between MS. That would be aligned with the common 
goal of the EU and future approach, which should be taken for more than only energy 
sector but also for other areas related to trading (Interview I, Market Surveillance Expert). 
6.2 COOPERATION ON NATIONAL AND EU LEVEL 
This section will elaborate on different cooperation perspectives as the best possible 
solution for the VAT fraud prevention. The main questions were the same in both 
interviews, following with different sub-questions on an ad hoc basis in this case in the 
direction of best practices for more cooperation between MS. The outcome of the second 
interview identifies two key views relevant for the enhancement of cooperation in the 
European energy market and the establishment of mechanisms to prevent VAT fraud. 
Those mechanisms are very general and refer to the cooperation at national level (as 
bottom up approach) and at the EU level (as top down approach). Both approaches on 
cooperation with their drawbacks are presented below. 
6.2.1 Cooperation at national level 
Cooperation at national level sees as best practice to notify as soon as possible the relevant 
tax authorities if there is a suspicion of behaviour related to VAT fraud. It is necessary to 
forward all the relevant information related to the potential suspicion as well as to establish 
a communication channel between regulatory authorities for energy and tax authorities 
and other entities that deal with monitoring activities. That is even more important due to 
the fact that one entity could start with an investigation and another one will enforce it, 
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which can also lead to two parallel investigations. Undertaking parallel investigations could 
become a useful tool when proper communication is ensured. The most important is 
therefore the comparison of the relevant data exchanges. Next, the issue with the data 
sharing and confidentiality obligations of tax authorities can undermine the latter. The tax 
authorities usually do not provide any feedback on their investigation, which is in most 
cases justified and reasonable, but represent a huge obstacle for cooperation, further 
investigation, etc. Mainly for that reasons, the regulatory authorities as first recipients of 
suspicious behaviour should inform on their intentions as well as provide their investigation 
to the relevant tax authorities, which have an overview and access to more information, 
which could help with an investigation. 
The drawbacks of such proposals are the establishment of communication channels 
between MS that point to the issue of trust between different authorities across MS. That 
could be changed with building safe communication channels where necessary, meaning 
where more cross-border transactions are taking place. This is a potentially good solution 
because it only focuses on the areas where the cooperation is necessary and where 
attention is required. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that this solution will 
not detect the potential fraud taking place since it is more focused towards prevention of 
fraud. Even if the solution presents an efficient approach for most affected areas, it could 
leave out the ones that fraudsters would discover in the future. This proposed solution can 
be used as a combination with another solution identified in the first interview (Interview 
II, Market Conduct Expert).  
6.2.2 Cooperation at the EU level  
Cooperation at the EU level is important especially when VAT fraud affects several 
jurisdictions. In that case, and as a next step the affected jurisdiction needs to be identified, 
based on all information provided. Similar as to the national level there is a need for data 
sharing. The only difference with such approach is that data can be obtain from sources 
collecting data on a European level, e.g. ACER and that further communication can be done 
through a European wide approach. The obvious issue here is the lack of competences at 
the European level. Organisation such as ACER can only monitor and coordinate the 
activities on energy markets and cannot perform enforcement when detecting potential 
breaches or manipulation.  
An important entity that contributes to cooperation at the EU level is Europol. As referred 
at the beginning of this thesis Europol presented a detailed report analysing VAT fraud 
highlighting it as a big impact on the EU markets. Europol is a European Agency such as 
ACER and therefore the disadvantage of not being able to perform enforcement tasks is 
similar. Nevertheless, both agencies are in charge for close monitoring and control over EU 
markets. A part of their database is shared with national energy authorities, providing the 
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authorities with a good start for the investigation when there is a suspicion, e.g. price 
change or spike seen on the market. Close cooperation with Europol is possible and any ad 
hoc meeting could be arranged for the need of information exchange already today. The 
next step in cooperation would be to establish an ongoing communication channel, which 
would allow for fast and quick data sharing and comparison between European bodies 
dealing with fraud. 
Another entity, EUROFISC, is identified as a good example of cooperation between tax 
authorities, especially in relation to sharing of information and accessible databases. 
Although the cooperation and sharing of information on EUROFISC’s level is mainly based 
on network between tax authorities, excluding ACER or national authorities for energy. The 
national authorities for energy do not have the possibility to contact EUROFISC directly, 
which is an issue when sharing data and performing an investigation without complete data 
transactions. A possible solution is to establish a ‘memorandum of understanding’ that 
provides a legal basis for future communication and cooperation between different 
authorities. ACER that would ensure respect of high security standards, as well as the 
establishment of standardised procedures regarding information exchange could control 
the establishment of contact points. The connection of databases or at least enhanced 
communication might need longer time to be confirmed and implemented but it would 
ensure stronger network more capable of discovering and/or preventing frauds. 
Another important and effortless solution would be creating a black list for companies not 
respecting their obligation towards market abuse regulations. The idea of such list was 
already proposed by some of the authorities but was never agreed due to confidentiality 
issues. The advantage is that once the agreement with all confidentiality standards is 
fulfilled, the implementation should be straightforward (Interview II, Market Conduct 
Expert).  
6.3 REMIT REGULATION RELATED SOLUTIONS 
Fraudulent behaviour can, at the same time, qualify as market manipulation if it meets the 
REMIT criteria such as sends misleading signals or sets the price at an artificial level 
(Interview II, Market Conduct Expert). Although, the REMIT Regulation is mainly focused on 
providing a legal framework for national authorities to be able to enforce and penalise an 
ongoing manipulation, it could provide a solution on the fraud issue. Under REMIT 
Regulation, ACER already collects data on wholesale energy market as well as performs 
regular check to identify potential market manipulation. Nevertheless, the database is not 
complete and a lot of behaviour remains unidentified. Correct reporting together with 
additional financial and human resources are necessary for performing proper analysis of 
the European wholesale energy markets (ACER, Internal documents). 
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The current and future solutions related to REMIT Regulation as well as solutions identified 
after potential manipulations reported to ACER are presented in the below paragraphs.  
An ongoing proposal for REMIT II Regulation, proposes revision in fields that require 
improvement as a possible way forward. The new revision for REMIT II Regulation could 
include obligations for MS (national regulators in the field of energy and tax authorities) to 
report additional transactions related to energy markets, such as emission allowances to 
ACER. That would allow for a proper European monitoring entity in the field of energy. This 
obligation should be connected only to energy trading companies, where only some are 
properly reporting their transactions, and therefore monitoring issues still exists.  
ACER could perform tasks of notifying tax or financial crimes authorities within its legal 
possibilities. Another possibility are power exchanges which have less restrictions in terms 
of notifications, and of course by tax authorities, that share their information only when 
they believe it is necessary. 
Reinforcement of KYC procedures when accepting new companies could be done in a way 
that a body such as dedicated ‘Decisional Committee’, which scrutinises the applications 
for a company to become a member of an exchange. During the KYC process, the Market 
Surveillance team within national authority can perform additional investigations. In 
addition, for each company, the MS monitors indicators (global and individual) which reveal 
potential VAT fraud activities.  
An example of potential manipulation was reported to ACER that causes the price to be at 
a level not justified by market forces of supply and demand. The relevant transactions may 
send misleading signals as to the price and volume on the main European markets. That 
happens when the sold volume is not bought (sell side volume not compensated by any 
extraordinary buy side activity) causing that the behaviour is likely to have a price impact. 
This is an example provided from the two interviews, which is covering 5 months of 
transactions. The average market price was 0.50 EUR/MWh lower than it would have been 
without the suspicious volumes (this amount represents an average; the maximum 
calculated daily impact can be higher). This calculation is made by simulating the auction 
with the original order books, and without the suspicious sale orders. From that example, 
we can see another issue caused by manipulation. That is the misuse of the market, which 
is detrimental for the confidence in the market and future integration of the EU markets, 
as well as the EU policy goals. Additionally, it could also affect market competition and in 
the worst case could be related to the repercussions on the security of energy supply 
(Interview I and II, Market Surveillance and Market Conduct Experts). 
6.4 QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS 
The questionnaire formulated with nine questions was shared with experts in the field of 
energy, from national regulators to energy exchanges, organised market places, and 
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research institutions in the EU. The questions were focused on the topic of VAT detection 
and prevention in line with some of the solutions already proposed in this chapter. In total, 
21 answers were received, out of 49 that accessed the questionnaire. Some of them 
reported not feeling competent to complete the questionnaire due to the lack of 
experience with the topic. Since the first question classified participants according to which 
type of organisation they are part of, outlined here are the respondents to the 
questionnaire, descending from highest to the lowest: 11 national regulatory authorities 
and ACER; 6 energy exchanges, organised market places or traders; 2 research institutions; 
1 transmission system operator and 1 financial authority.  
The second question referred to major difficulties in preventing VAT fraud, with multiple 
options for respondents. The most respondents chose the second proposed option – no 
harmonised approach of the Reverse charge mechanism across the EU. Next, the answer 
that there is not enough information available was chosen 10 times and lack of cooperation 
between MS was chosen 9 times. The option of non-centralised approach was chosen 5 
times. Two answers under option "Other" were: ‘tax secrecy rules and missing rules that 
allow/oblige tax authorities and energy authorities to cooperate and exchange information; 
missing knowledge of energy trading with tax authority; fraudster disappear quickly’ and ‘ 
delays between alerts and action from regulators’. Only one responder chose the option – 
no difficulties. The provided replies show importance of harmonisation of the existing RCM 
as the main concern across the MS. That is also aligned with the common statement from 
Epexspot (2018) on the extension of RCM for energy commodities. Not enough available 
information remains an issue and it is closely connected to the answer provided under 
"Other" referring to missing rules for cooperation between tax authorities and energy 
trading that should be improved in order to found out which persons are behind the 
fraudulent chains. Another issue are the delays, meaning slow reactions, which reveal that 
a better cooperation between authorities is necessary.  
The third question focused on the most appropriate tools that should prevent VAT fraud, 
with multiple answers possible. The frequency of answers shows that the most commonly 
selected option is again the existing RCM (selected 14 times), followed by the screening of 
market participants (selected 13 times). Those are the most popular options that could 
point towards the fact that a combination between existing and possible solutions is the 
best outcome for prevention of VAT fraud. The third most popular option is reduction to a 
‘zero tax’ system (selected 8 times). Option Blockchain technology (selected 2 times) shows 
either that there is not enough trust, or that the responders are not familiar with such 
technological approach. Under option "Other" legislative proposals (selected 1 time) a 
proposal for ‘definitive VAT system’ was mentioned and an option "other technologies" 
(selected 0 times), which could imply the same assumptions as presumed for the Blockchain 
technology answer.   
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The fourth question focused on the tools that should detect VAT fraud, with multiple 
answers possible. These were two most popular options – a centralised European market 
surveillance (selected 17 times), followed by the Know Your Customer (selected 15 times). 
Three answers to other legislative proposals from the EU or MS are the following: 
‘information sharing between tax authorities, NRAs and ACER’, ‘a European taxation 
system’ and ‘enhanced law enforcement and tax cooperation’. These answers point to 
three very different proposals that are analysed in the previous two chapters. The option 
of Blockchain was chosen once, as well as the option other technologies, where one of the 
responders underlined the ‘surveillance of (TSO)18 nomination data’ as a possible tool for 
detection of VAT fraud. 
The fifth question considers the best-placed entity for detection of VAT fraud, and 
highlighted ACER as the most frequent answer (selected 15 times). Other options in 
descending other were tax authorities (selected 13 times), NRAs (selected 10 times), energy 
exchanges (selected 9 times), and other (selected 4 times). Under other the provided 
answers were the following: ‘TSOs’, ‘a European tax authority’, ‘cooperation between 
authorities necessary; energy companies and exchanges to report suspicious activities; 
cooperate’ and ‘GO registries (for fraud in GOs)’. The provided answers to this question 
gave many different options. The key outcome confirms answers given during the 
interviews, which is a European wide approach and an entity to implement and control 
such approach. Acknowledgment should be made towards the second answer, which 
qualifies tax authorities as a second best placed entity for VAT fraud detection. Because the 
majority of the participants choose multiple options, a possible conclusion to the question 
is that the combination of more entities are considered as best placed for VAT fraud 
detection, in this case ACER and tax authorities.  
The sixth question asked about the possibility of change of the legal framework in order to 
improve cooperation between institutions in practice and had three possible answers. Out 
of 21 answers, 17 respondents answered yes, and with that confirmed the change of legal 
framework to improve cooperation. Respondents who believe no change is necessary are 
2 and 2 answered that other approach is necessary. It is clear that most of the respondents 
think that legal background would be most suitable for better cooperation between 
relevant institutions. The next question elaborates further on the most appropriate 
approach related to cooperation and legal framework.   
The seventh question asked the respondents on how the cooperation between relevant 
institutions could be improved. The most commonly chosen answer was – Regular 
exchange of information about suspicious patterns (18 selected), which shows that 
                                                            
18Transmission System Operator (TSO) is an actor responsible for controlling and operating high voltage grid. 
TSO also ensures safety and stability of the networks therefore performing maintenance as one of key tasks, 
retrieved from: https://renewables-grid.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/Files_RGI/RGI_Publications/Factsheets/ 
RGI_ Factsheet_TSO.pdf.  
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cooperation and information exchange are the most popular changes, also in line with the 
change of legal framework connected to the previous question. The second most frequent 
answer was the expert training on tax regulations for energy regulators (15 selected), that 
shows energy regulators like to obtain more information in order to be able to deal with 
VAT fraud more efficiently. The third most frequent option was the Expert training on 
market design issues for tax authorities (12 selected), showing that training for tax 
authorities is almost as equally important as for energy regulators in order to better deal 
with VAT fraud. The exchange of staff between stakeholders was less frequent but still 
relevant option (selected 7 times). The exchange of staff is a regular practice for some 
European institutions, and represents an option that allows for better insights and knowing 
of procedures. Despite that the options such as regular exchange of information, following 
with trainings for staff prevail due to faster and more efficient approach. Under option 
"Other", the provided answer was ‘a list of repeat offenders’. That is a possible solution, 
which is already an established practice with some authorities, but which is rarely shared 
outside of respected institutions. The so-called blacklist was also mentioned as a possible 
solution during the second Interview. Although a blacklist could be extremely helpful for 
investigations, it represents many security and other issues and it was never implemented 
among energy regulators.  
The eighth question focused on the REMIT regulation and asked respondents if VAT issues 
could be captured under regulation specialised for energy manipulation and price impact. 
Out of 21 respondents, 12 agreed to the proposal of REMIT regulation examining VAT fraud 
more closely and 5 respondents did not believe REMIT regulation could be a suitable 
solution for VAT prevention. The remaining answers provided under option "Other" were 
4. The two answers inclined towards REMIT regulation as proper solution for VAT 
prevention were ‘yes, as long as there is no European wide reverse charge or other 
mechanism to prevent vat fraud but tax authorities have to support that’ and ‘vat fraud is 
one of many behaviours with potential price impact. It should be addressed in some way 
in remit, but perhaps not directly in the market manipulation provisions.’ The 2 answers 
opposing REMIT Regulation as a solution were ‘the biggest threat is not the immediate price 
impact from vat fraud on the market but the (long term) loss of trust into the price signals 
send out by the market. in my opinion this is not that much of a remit issue.’ and ‘very hard 
to connect vat fraud to remit provisions’. Despite the fact that the last two statements are 
correctly stating difficulties with REMIT Regulation, the previous subsection gives more 
detailed explanation on how the issue could be tackled. The majority of answers support 
the proposal of REMIT Regulation as a proper solution to address the ongoing VAT issue. 
Such regulation would serve as a legal background of European wide approach and would 
therefore be extremely useful tool when performing an investigation of VAT fraud related 
to energy market.   
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The ninth question exposed respondents to a general view on the situation on the market 
and asked if the VAT fraud is properly contained at the moment. Out of 21 replies, 18 
believe that there is not enough information available to the responsible authorities in 
order to answer that question. That shows a clear lack of information among energy 
experts and supports the fact that more cooperation and exchange of information is 
necessary. 3 respondents believe that we have only seen the tip of the iceberg so far, 
meaning that VAT fraud will expand to energy commodities in the future even more. None 
of the respondents believe that the worst is behind us. This question clearly highlights the 
issue of there not being enough available information since the majority of respondents 
(84 %) could not provide a yes or no answer to the question.  
The key findings of this questionnaire are related in the first place to the lack of harmonised 
RCM as reasons for VAT fraud in the EU. Even further, the RCM is mentioned as the most 
effective tool for VAT prevention. The answers related to the most effective tools for 
detection of VAT, clearly highlights the centralised approach and ACER as the best placed 
entity to execute such tasks. The analysis of all further answers shows cooperation and 
exchange of information are the most popular answers together with the change of legal 
framework that would ensure those measures are increased. The questionnaire therefore 
confirms both of the hypotheses postulated in this thesis. 
6.5 SOLUTIONS OVERVIEW 
According to the performed research, the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed 
solutions are outlined in the table 2 below. The table summarise solutions obtained by two 
interviews  responders of the survey.  
The main difference with the previous table is that the solutions in this chapter are not 
implemented or only partially compared to the ones in previous chapter that are either 
already fully integrated in the system or otherwise tested in other countries.  
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Table 2: Overview of proposed solutions from energy experts at ACER 
 Proposed solution Advantages Disadvantages 
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Centralised European 
surveillance  
Faster detection of fraud; 
Overview of all the information 
from one central point 
Legal constrains; 
Data quality and 
reporting issues 
Harmonization of VAT 
for all MS 
VAT fraud elimination 
Lot of coordination and 
cooperation between 
MSs to reach such 
agreement 
Im
p
le
m
en
te
d
 s
o
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Cooperation at national 
level 
Communication channel 
between MS 
 
Lack of trust between 
MS; 
Parallel investigations; 
Confidentiality of 
authorities  
Cooperation at the EU 
level 
European wide approach Difficult implementation 
REMIT Regulation European wide approach 
No sanctioning and 
enforcement powers – 
possible only with future 
law changes  
Source: Own elaboration  
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7 VERIFICATION OF HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION 
This chapter will elaborate on the two hypotheses postulated in the beginning of this 
research. Their verification in connection to the main solutions provided in previous two 
chapters will be explained together with future proposals and research contributions. The 
importance of the general elimination of VAT fraud is one of the obvious goals of the EU 
institutions and national authorities. Focusing on the energy markets, that are of more 
complicated structure and where more actors are involved this research includes different 
approaches as it would for other markets. The analysis of advantages and disadvantages of 
the RCM, zero-rate derogation, technological solutions as well as opinion of energy experts 
are viewed as necessary steps for recognising the current and future challenges in the field 
of VAT fraud on energy markets. That is due to many different individual estimation 
methodologies of either general VAT or MTIC VAT that defined the MTIC as the reason for 
highest losses in the field of VAT fraud in the EU. The required coordination and consistency 
between MS was already seen as a proper way forward to achieve goal of single European 
Energy market in Europe. It turns out that such approach would require faster actions not 
only to achieve single energy market but also to prevent its misuse as it happened and it is 
still happening in the case of VAT fraud. 
Since the first hypothesis focuses on available information and coordinated approach to 
prevent a VAT gap towards VAT collection and identification, it is important that solutions 
presented in Table 1 and Table 2 in the previous two chapters are the focus of the 
verification. The first hypothesis is mainly overlooking the solutions from the perspective 
of VAT fraud prevention. Therefore, out of all existing solutions presented, the already 
implemented RCM is still the most relevant existing approach according to energy experts. 
On the other hand, the individual experts view received from the two interviews is 
proposing a European wide cooperation approach as a best way forward towards VAT fraud 
elimination. The outcome of the interviews highlights the European approach as a 
prerequisite for all solutions, either implemented or non-implemented. The European wide 
cooperation and synchronisation between MS would allow other solutions to be properly 
implemented further. A common conclusion could be drawn on the issue of lack of sharing 
information between different authorities. It is proposed that such hypothesis would follow 
further development into identifying ways to implement cooperation, information sharing 
and consistency.  Second hypothesis is having less divergent views; therefore, a stronger 
conclusion could be drawn. All experts opinion presented in this thesis identify the 
European wide monitoring as the most efficient detection tool. There is a strong support 
for a European entity, such as ACER to be responsible for monitoring of energy markets 
related to VAT fraud (as it does currently for other types of market manipulation) especially 
in line with detection of ongoing frauds. The mentioned RCM is seen as best solution and 
less attention is seen towards technology-based solutions, which represent potential 
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towards easier cooperation between MS. The technological solutions are not properly 
recognised between MS where focus towards finding proper technological solution could 
improve reporting system and control over VAT system. If some diverging views could be 
seen in the first hypothesis, the second hypothesis clearly confirm European monitoring as 
a mean of VAT fraud detection.   
Confirming the need for cooperation between MS was one of expected results of this 
thesis. The approach that would best tackle MTIC fraud is defined as the next, more 
complicated step. On top of that, the different mechanisms in place are influencing the VAT 
fraud in the EU energy market. Among all presented solutions, the obvious and generally 
implemented RCM solution is seen as a proper approach. The reason is that most analysis 
and practical conclusions were performed on this approach. RCM is thus confirmed as a 
well-established and easy solution. In contrast, the zero-derogation bringing more 
distortions to the market than any of the presented solutions, is not seen as a proper 
solution to combat VAT frauds. The lack of knowledge related to technological solutions 
should not be overlooked. The fact is that solutions such as DICE are already well 
established in other countries outside of EU. VATCoin is another solution, recognising the 
high level of technical knowledge needed to keep pace with fraudsters and adapt same as 
they do when performing fraudulent chains. The centralised approach for control is 
showing support between energy experts across the EU, but only towards VAT fraud 
detection. In general, elimination or prevention has to be done with other solutions or at 
least with a combination between a European with another solution.  
The future inputs of this thesis are outlining a basis for the analysis of energy market 
distortions that would identify VAT fraud. The models used by Frunza (2010, p. 12) focused 
on emission allowances market provide results that could be performed today for 
electricity, gas and GOs commodities. Such analysis, with proper data could serve as a proof 
for VAT fraud on electricity, gas and GOs. Those models are proposed to be used and 
developed by an entity that already has centralised data collection, therefore ACER is seen 
as a proper solution. Constantly improved cooperation between MS, and a support to a 
European tool are representing combination of tools that should be further developed.  
The basic framework for both, VAT fraud elimination and detection is there, now the 
countries and the EU would have to work further to agree on the implementation and take 
those approaches on a next level.   
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8 CONCLUSION 
VAT fraud is a pervasive concept well known among authorities all over the world, which 
makes it interesting to see how the change from simple fraud on moving goods spread onto 
more high-level fraud, performed on carbon market as well as in electricity, gas and GOs 
markets. Since the EU with its new established internal market rules and reforms, such as 
the VAT Directive was still learning on how to best coordinate and implement its systems 
internally, that made the European space the best target for white-collar crimes.  
VAT fraud hit the market participants of the European wholesale energy market as much 
as the responsible regulators unprepared. Mitigating actions were only implemented after 
cases with high damages to taxpayers occurred and caught media attention. When 
conducting this research, such cases present a proof of spread of VAT fraud in Europe. 
Therefore, the conclusion after research of cases shows how quickly fraud moves from 
individual traders to highly respected entities such as banks and international companies. 
Either aware or unaware of being part of the VAT fraud chain, the element that works in 
favour of fraud taking place are quick reactions, which allows for covering fraudulent chains 
or make it impossible to discover them. A first conclusion drawn from looking into and 
performing a comparison between different VAT fraud cases is that VAT rules and measures 
which were put in place were done with great haste and in an uncoordinated and 
inconsistent manner across Europe.  There has also been a lack of consensus among the 
MS.   Until today, the problem can neither be easily detected nor can it be effectively 
prevented under the existing framework for all traded commodities. Since then many 
solutions to deal with the existing VAT threat emerged. The RCM is a general solution 
proposed to solve ongoing issues emerged with carousel fraud in Europe, build based on 
the existing VAT framework. Nevertheless, the RCM is not the only solution that could 
prevent VAT fraud. Related to different types of fraud chains that were described in this 
thesis also different solutions are presented, those represent other suitable solutions to 
solve the existing VAT gap. It is not a surprise that new technologies offered various 
solutions to the existing problem. As already mentioned, the fraudsters mainly used their 
knowledge of trading schemes combined with the knowledge of technology to perform a 
fraud. The identified cases showed that fraudsters were highly knowledgeable and well 
prepared. These are the characteristics most notable for the identified VAT fraud case on 
the energy market commodities.  
The best way forward towards elimination of VAT fraud should follow simple and a long-
term solution. Therefore approach such as cooperation between MS as proposed in the 
first hypothesis should be followed as well as further improved collaboration between MS. 
Out of many presented solutions that cover variety of proposals from researchers, newly 
established technologies and governmental approaches most of them can be appropriate 
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for VAT elimination if synchronised approach between MS is followed. Since that is not an 
easy task to achieve, the combination of solutions is proposed. Therefore, the conclusion 
drawn from analysis of various solutions is to follow the European approach, especially 
when collection of data and surveillance is in question. That kind of approach would be best 
combined with already implemented RCM. Combination of existing solutions such as RCM 
with non-implemented solution such as European surveillance is seen as best way forward 
after the analysis performed. Lastly, is important to mention that further technologies 
could be even more beneficial but before they can be introduced, more collaboration 
between MS is needed. Currently, the biggest problem is that information between 
authorities is not shared. That is an issue that could be solved with cooperation and a, 
consistent approach supported by more firm legislation from the EU.  
This thesis only gives possible best solutions that would need to be further implemented 
and considered. If a plan for a solution such as a common European approach should be 
accepted as a way forward, 28 MS would have to confirm and agree on common rules that 
would require a national coordination. This is an increasing challenge in all areas of the EU's 
activities.  Nevertheless, once implemented a common approach would represent stronger 
tool to combat VAT fraud, especially in the case of missing trader. Countries also need to 
be aware that fraud is constantly evolving and adapting to the market, therefore a common 
and centralised approach is more than a necessary requirement for the future solution of 
VAT fraud on energy market.  
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APPENDIXES 
APPENDIX I 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS – VAT FRAUD IN THE EU ENERGY MARKET 
1. What is your opinion on the recent VAT fraud happening on the market? 
 
2. What would you suggest as the best solution to the ongoing fraud in the EU 
energy market? 
a) How can this solution be implemented in best way possible? 
b) Does the proposed solution(s) works more towards VAT fraud prevention or 
detection? 
c) What are the drawbacks of your proposed solution?  
 
3. Is there a different approach, solution that needs to be considered for each of the 
energy commodities e.g. electricity, gas, emission allowance and GO? 
 
4. The price impact resulting from VAT fraud represents a threat to the integrity of 
the market. Should market manipulation provisions of the REMIT Regulation 
examine VAT fraud more closely? 
 
5. In your opinion, is VAT fraud in energy wholesale markets properly contained at 
the moment?  
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APPENDIX II 
QUESTIONNAIRE – VAT FRAUD IN THE EU ENERGY MARKET  
 
Background: The spread of VAT fraud into the energy commodity market has been 
described as one of the main threats to the integrity of the European energy market since 
its liberalisation. The purpose of this research is to determine why the spread of VAT fraud 
into the energy market has been so rapid, what the consequences have been, and whether 
the fixes, which were implemented under great time pressure, have been sufficient. 
 
1. Please specify the type of organisation that you represent: 
 
2. What is the main difficulty in preventing VAT fraud in wholesale energy markets?  
a) Lack of cooperation between member states 
b) No harmonised approach of the RCM across the EU 
c) Not enough information to recognize the fraud non-centralized approach 
between MS 
d) No difficulties   
e) Other (please specify): 
 
3. What are the most effective tools to prevent VAT fraud? 
a) Existing Reverse charge mechanism  
b) A centralized European market surveillance (e.g.  by ACER) 
c) Reduction to a “zero tax” for energy wholesale trading 
d) Blockchain technology 
e) Other legislative proposals from the EU, national member states, which ones:  
f) Other technologies (VATcoin, Machine learning, DICE, etc.) 
 
4. What are the most effective tools to detect VAT fraud? 
a) Existing Reverse charge mechanism  
b) A centralized European market surveillance (e.g.  by ACER) 
c) Reduction to a “zero tax” for energy wholesale trading 
d) Blockchain technology 
e) Other legislative proposals from the EU, national member states, which ones:  
f) Other technologies (VATcoin, Machine learning, DICE, etc.) 
 
5. Who is best placed to detect VAT fraud in energy wholesale markets? 
a) National Regulatory Authorities  
b) The Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators  
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c) Exchanges 
d) Tax authorities 
e) Other:  
 
6. Is it necessary to change the legal framework in order to improve the cooperation 
between the institutions? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Other approach is necessary 
 
7. How can cooperation and knowledge-sharing between institutions that deal with 
VAT fraud be improved?  
a) Exchange of staff between stakeholders  
b) Expert training on market design issues for tax authorities 
c) Expert training on tax regulations for energy regulators 
d) Regular exchange of information about suspicious patterns 
 
8. The price impact resulting from VAT fraud represents a threat to the integrity of 
the market. Should market manipulation provisions of the REMIT Regulation 
examine VAT fraud more closely? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Other (please specify): 
 
9. In your opinion is VAT fraud in energy wholesale markets properly contained at 
the moment?  
a) Yes, the worst should be behind us 
b) No, we’ve only seen the tip of the ice berg so far 
c) There is not enough information available to the responsible authorities in 
order to answer that question. 
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